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NEW MEXICO'S ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ROBERT J. TEPPER*
I. INTRODUCTION
New Mexico has a legislatively enacted accountant-client privilege, which, by its
terms, is applicable in state court proceedings.' In large measure, however, this
privilege is probably unenforceable for two reasons. First, this statutory privilege
may be viewed as being beyond the scope of power of the legislature to enact, given
the New Mexico Supreme Court's plenary power regarding rules of evidence,
particularly evidentiary privileges.2 Alternatively, the statutory accountant-client
privilege would probably be deemed a rule of procedure abrogated by the adoption
of New Mexico's current rules of evidence.3 The confusion surrounding the validity
of New Mexico's accountant-client privilege has implications not only for the
weight of legislative judgments concerning privilege, but also for lawyers and
accountants advising clients as well as clients who might rely upon such a privilege.
This Article considers the nature of and justification for an accountant-client
privilege, the lack of a comprehensive federal accountant-client privilege, and the
current legal situation in New Mexico. Part II discusses the rationale for and against
an accountant-client privilege and provides a comparison to the more established
attorney-client privilege. This Part concludes that, given competing policy choices,
a state legislature could rationally enact such a privilege.
In Part lII, the focus shifts to federal law, particularly to the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the U.S. Supreme Court's emphatic rejection of a common law
accountant-client privilege or work-product privilege, at least in the federal tax
context. Although a federally authorized tax practitioner-client privilege exists, it
provides very limited protection for clients. Part Ill concludes that confidential
communications between accountant and client might be protected under the
attorney-client privilege, but only when the accountant is working under the
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1. New Mexico statutory law provides:
In the courts of the state, no certified public accountant or public accountant shall be permitted
to disclose information obtained in the conduct of any examination, audit or other investigation
made in a professional capacity, or which may have been disclosed to said accountant by a
client, without the consent in writing of such client or his, her or its successors or legal
representatives.
NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C) (1973).
The section in which the accountant-client privilege may be found is entitled "Privileged communications." Id.
§ 38-6-6. In New Mexico, the title of a statute may be used in construing its meaning. E.g., State v. Smith, 2004NMSC-032, 14, 98 P.3d 1022, 1027.
Section 38-6-6 also contains marital communications and attorney-client privileges. NMSA 1978, § 38-66(A)-(B); see also State v. Teel, 103 N.M. 684, 685, 712 P.2d 792, 793 (Ct. App. 1985) (characterizing section 386-6(A) as a "spousal testimonial privilege"). The statute, however, does not expressly state that such
communications are privileged. Compare NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(A)-(B), with IND. CODE ANN. § 25-2.1-14-2
(LexisNexis 2006) (containing an express statement of the "privileged and confidential" nature of "[tihe information
derived from or as a result of professional [accounting] services").
2. For a discussion of the New Mexico Supreme Court's authority in this area, see infra notes 207-281 and
accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the treatment of the rules of procedure and the enactment of the current rules of
evidence in New Mexico, see infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
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direction of the client's attorney and is providing services exclusively for the
rendition of legal advice.
Part IV discusses how the New Mexico accountant-client privilege might operate,
focusing, in part, on its limitations. It also discusses the questionable validity of the
statutory privilege given (1) the New Mexico Supreme Court's plenary power over
rules of evidence and (2) the enactment of the rules of evidence, which did not
create a role for the legislature in formulating privileges. Although two recent
decisions of the New Mexico Supreme Court have moderated this approach by
recognizing the possibility of legislatively created privileges that have close
correspondence to existing constitutional or court-created privileges, Part IV
concludes that the accountant-client privilege may lack such correspondence. In so
concluding, Part IV surveys the ethical responsibilities of New Mexico accountants
imposed by statute that may conflict with such a privilege. This conflict may suggest
that the accountant-client privilege was repealed by implication.
Part V suggests a need for clarity so that lawyers, accountants, and the public are
apprised of the validity of the privilege. Such clarity might come through litigation,
a constitutional amendment allowing the legislature to create evidentiary privileges
(or rules of evidence generally), repealing the present accountant-client privilege,
or, ideally, harmonizing the existing statutory provisions concerning confidential
client communications.
The validity of the New Mexico statutory accountant-client privilege is uncertain
and should be evaluated against a backdrop of federal and state law. As mentioned
above, a variety of steps might be taken to clarify the legal status of confidential
client communications in state court proceedings. This clarification would have the
salutary effect of apprising lawyers, accountants, and the public (including clients)
of the extent to which such communications are protected, at least in state law
matters.
II. NATURE OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRIVILEGE
Evidentiary privileges are recognized only for compelling reasons because they
exclude relevant evidence. The law presumes a right to every person's evidence.4
Most rules of evidence facilitate the search for truth. Given this truth-seeking
function, the law places a duty to testify on individuals who can offer relevant
evidence. Privileges are evidentiary rules that grant certain individuals the right to
withhold evidence. Accordingly, privileges are exceptional and recognized only for
compelling reasons.' Some privileges are recognized at common law; others are not.
Privileges, particularly those not recognized at common law, such as the accountantclient privilege, are construed narrowly so as to minimize conflict between the truthseeking function of the legal process and the duty to testify.6

4. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996); Estate of Romero ex reL Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 2006NMSC-028, 7, 137 P.3d 611,614.
5. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr.
v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 17, 120 P.3d 820, 826.
6. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998); see also Colo. State Bd. of Accountancy
v. Zaveral Boosalis Raisch, 960 P.2d 102, 106 (Colo. 1998) ("[Evidentiary privileges] should be recognized only
within the narrowest limits required by principle."); Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 107 N.M. 679, 687, 763
P.2d 1144, 1152 (1988) (discussing strict construction of the common-law attorney-client privilege).
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An accountant-client privilege is not recognized at common law but has been
added in some state jurisdictions to enhance the accountant-client relationship by
encouraging client candor and protecting the privacy of clients' financial data.7
Inevitably, the accountant-client privilege is compared to the attorney-client
privilege. However, accountants and attorneys perform different functions. While
an attorney's obligation is primarily to represent his or her client zealously within
the bounds of the law, an accountant also may have more responsibility to the
public. 8 Although an accountant-client privilege might encourage greater disclosure
by clients, it is inconsistent with accounting and auditing trends, which may require
greater investigation and reliability in reporting. 9 In the end, because it is a choice
between competing policies, whether to adopt an accountant-client privilege seems
well-suited for legislative resolution.
A. Rationalefor an Accountant-Client Privilege

Some privileges are necessary for the proper functioning of relationships between
two or more parties. Professor Wigmore suggests that courts should recognize
privileges if "four fundamental conditions" are met:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory

maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3)The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulouslyfostered.

(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communication must be greaterthan the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation."
This "utilitarian" approach justifies some privileges based upon their necessity in
fostering particular socially useful relationships." Several courts have discussed this
approach when deciding accountant-client privilege cases.12
An application of Wigmore's utilitarian factors results in different views on
whether an accountant-client privilege extending to confidential client

7. For a discussion of the various rationales for an accountant-client privilege, see infra Part II.A. For a
discussion of the number of state jurisdictions recognizing such a privilege, see infra note 317 and accompanying
text.
8. For a discussion of the functions of an attorney and an accountant and their primary responsibilities
insofar as privilege, see infra notes 35-46, 103-111 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of accounting and auditing trends that may require greater investigation and reliability
in reporting, see infra notes 55-79.
10. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2285, at 527 (rev. ed. 1961).
11.

1 CHARLES MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 300 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.

1999).
12. See, e.g., Int'l Horizons, Inc. v. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 16 B.R. 484, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(determining that it was unlikely that the debtors in question had relied upon an accountant-client privilege or that
it was essential for the proper functioning of the accountant-client relationship); Zaveral Boosalis Raisch, 960 P.2d
at 106 n.4 (setting out factors in the context of recognizing that such a privilege encourages full and frank discussion
between accountant and client); Ernst & Ernst v. Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co., 381 N.E.2d 897, 901-02 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1978) (deciding that allowing an accountant, instead of the client, to assert an accountant-client privilege
was contrary to the purpose of the legislatively enacted privilege).
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communications should exist.13 Beginning with the first factor, most clients disclose
financial information with the expectation that the accountant will hold it in
confidence, 14 and a certified public accountant (CPA) is professionally obligated "to
hold the affairs of clients in confidence."' 5 Whether clients expect that the
information conveyed will be further protected by an evidentiary privilege is another
matter. Accountants are largely in the business of producing reports and disclosures
for clients.' 6 Much of the information conveyed to CPAs will find its way into
documents that will be viewed by a limited class of third parties such as federal and
state taxing authorities, corporate governing authorities, regulatory authorities, or
even the general public through U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
mandated disclosure. 17At the same time, even though a limited class of third parties
may be granted access to certain financial information, many reports and disclosures
are not meant to be public.' 8
A client's reasonable expectation of confidentiality might also be shaped by a
lawyer or an accountant's advice concerning privilege. Regardless of New Mexico's
statutory accountant-client privilege, lawyers and accountants are surely on notice,
based on decades of case law, that federal law provides very little protection for
confidential communications between accountant and client and does not recognize
an accountant-client privilege.' 9
Turning to the necessity of confidentiality to maintain the accountant-client
relationship, many clients may be willing to disclose far more information than is
required by law or professional standards based on an assumption that the
information is confidential or even privileged. Such information, though not
disclosed to either the authorities or the public, may prove useful to the accountant
in deciding how to comply with regulatory requirements. Given the accountant's
expertise, clients are better served if the accountant makes the initial determination
of relevancy of the client's information. To the extent that this information will be
utilized in publicly available reports, the justification for confidentiality wanes. An
inverse relationship exists between the amount of public disclosure and the
justification for an accountant-client privilege-the more disclosure, the less

13. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. E.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Most clients
reasonably expect the accountant will keep virtually all of their business and personal records secret.").
15. NMAC 16.60.5.6, available at http://www.nmcpr.state.nm.us/NMAC/parts/titlel6/16.060.0005.htm.
Such information is also statutorily "deemed confidential." NMSA 1978, § 61-28B-24 (1999).
16. Denzil Causey &Frances McNair, An Analysis ofState Accountant-ClientPrivilegeStatutes and Public
Policy Implicationsfor the Accountant-ClientRelationship,27 AM. BUS. L.J. 535, 550 (1990).
17. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 325 (1973); 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5427, at 809 (1980).

18. The Internal Revenue Code places limits on the disclosure of federal tax returns and return information.
I.R.C. § 6103 (2000). Similarly, New Mexico statutory law places limits on disclosure of state tax returns and other
information about a taxpayer. NMSA 1978, § 7-1-8 (2005). While these statutes allow limited disclosure for certain
purposes, particularly the investigation and enforcement of the tax laws, they suggest that the disclosure of the
supporting information is a private matter, and a general policy of non-disclosure is appropriate for privacy
protection. Of course, as discussed below, privacy statutes are not synonymous with evidentiary privileges.
19. In Couch v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court unambiguously rejected a federal accountant-client
privilege and noted that federal law does not recognize state-created accountant-client privileges. 409 U.S. at 335.
For a discussion of unanimous federal law not recognizing an accountant-client privilege and of the limited
protection of confidential client communications between accountants and clients, see infra Part I.
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justification for the protection afforded by an accountant-client privilege. Given the
complexity of laws relating to financial disclosure, for example tax and securities
laws, and the mandatory nature of governmental regulation, most would agree that
relationships between accountants and clients should be encouraged. As a practical
matter, the alternative, where persons or other entities provide such services
themselves or in house (so as to avoid disclosure concerns), is unrealistic given the
specialized knowledge and many years of training needed to adequately complete
these tasks. The advice furnished by accountants helps to ensure that the choices
eventually made by clients concerning compliance and disclosure are both knowing
and voluntary.2 °
When considering the potential injury to the accountant-client relationship caused
by disclosure versus the correct resolution of the litigation, the main issue is whether
clients would disclose all relevant information absent an accountant-client privilege.
On one hand, the current system requiring voluntary compliance with tax and
securities laws, and the potential for civil or criminal enforcement, may well be a
sufficient incentive for full disclosure by the client.21 An accountant certainly has
an incentive to encourage full disclosure given tax return-preparer penalties 22 and
possible civil liability arising from inadequate disclosure. 23 Likewise, a client has
an incentive to disclose because the accountant, if aware of material non-disclosed
information, may withdraw from the engagement. In the case of an audit, an
accountant may respond to a client's non-disclosure with a qualified opinion based
on a scope limitation, a disclaimer of opinion, or a withdrawal from the engagement.24 These options weigh in favor of full disclosure of information by clients
without an evidentiary privilege. 2' Additionally, accountants are required to keep
information confidential.

20. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (suggesting that an attorney who
persuaded a client to withhold privileged documents from the government surely would not be obstructing justice).
21. See United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 122 (2004) (noting that the federal tax system is one of selfassessment); SEC. v. Toomey, 866 F. Supp. 719, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that civil enforcement actions by the
SEC promote voluntary compliance with the securities laws).
22. I.R.C. § 6694 (2000) (listing tax return preparer penalties for unrealistic positions and for
understatements due to willful or reckless conduct).
23. This may take the form of liability based on either securities laws or on professional negligence. See,
e.g., In re Suprema Specialties, Inc., 438 F.3d 256, 279-81 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing auditor liability under federal
statutory and regulatory laws); In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 198-99, 213-14 (1st Cir.
2005) (discussing auditor liability under federal statutory law); Vigil v. State Auditor's Office, 2005-NMCA-096,
IN 13-18, 116 P.3d 854, 859--60 (discussing auditor liability to third parties for negligence and noting that New
Mexico has yet to adopt an approach); see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (providing
a comprehensive discussion of auditor liability for negligence and negligent misrepresentation).
24. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing Standards No.
58, § 508.22 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2004). An independent auditor expresses an opinion on the
fairness with which the financial statements "present, in all material respects, financial position, results of
operations, and.. .cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles." CODIFICATION OF
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing Standards No. 1, § 110.01 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 2004). The audit report may express an unqualified opinion, a qualified opinion, an
adverse opinion, or a disclaimer of opinion. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES,
Statement of Auditing Standards No. 58, § 508.10.
25. See, e.g., Int'l Horizons, Inc. v. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 16 B.R. 484, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(explaining that a debtor's full disclosure to an accounting firm was ensured by the debtor's need for certified
financial statements and the accounting firm's unwillingness to certify without full disclosure).
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On the other hand, clients might well be more forthcoming if they knew that their
communications would be held in confidence even if a matter ended up in litigation.
To the extent that this is true, clients would be less likely to self-select information
that they relayed to the accountant.26 Any such incremental gain in disclosure would
have to be balanced against the potential loss of the accountant's independent
perspective, which is essential for an audit,27 and the potential revenue loss coupled
with less efficient tax administration.28
Another rationale for some privilege rules is the protection of privacy, 29 although
at least one well-respected treatise would view the protection of personal privacy as
distinct from matters relating to business or financial affairs.3 ° Privileges protect
privacy to the extent that they limit disclosure of client-provided personal
information. In the context of a tax investigation, the U.S. Supreme Court has
rejected the notion that one has a legitimate expectation of privacy "where records
are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the
information therein is required in an income tax return. '31 Although a few courts
have relied on financial privacy concerns in discussing the accountant-client
privilege,32 any right to financial privacy would seem to be more limited than a
privilege and would certainly be subject to an ad hoc balancing against the

26. Of course, this is also the rationale for an attorney-client privilege. In discussing the attorney-client
privilege, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that it is the oldest common-law privilege, and
[i]ts purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
27. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing Standards No.
150, § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2004); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465
U.S. 805, 819 (1984) (discussing the "independent auditor's obligation to serve the public interest").
28. Harold N. Bynum, Note, Evidence-PrivilegedCommunications-Accountantand Client, 46 N.C. L.
REv. 419, 424-26 (1968). Of course, federal law already recognizes a limited tax practitioner-client privilege for
legal advice by a tax-practitioner, I.R.C. §7525(a)(1) (2000), but an accountant-client privilege probably would not
be so limited.
29. 1 MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 72, 77, at 300, 321. McCormick suggests that the utilitarian
justification of privilege results in near-absolute privileges based upon "highly questionable sociological premises,"
whereas the privacy justification allows for an ad hoc balancing test in deciding whether matters should be
privileged. Id. § 77, at 321. As a practical matter, a court called on to apply a statutory accountant-client privilege
is likely to consider policy interests.
30. WRIGHT& GRAHAM, supra note 17.
31. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973). In United States v. Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that a depositor lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in bank records
revealed to government authorities. 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). The Court has yet to regard financial decisions
as implicating the same personal autonomy concerns as "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education" that are protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
32. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Underwriter's Nat'l Assurance Co., 381 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)
(noting that in enacting the Indiana accountant-client privilege, "the legislature has made ajudgment that the welfare
of the client will be best served if matters communicated between client and accountant are subject to a zone of
privacy controlled by the client"); In re A Special Investigation # 202, 452 A.2d 458,462 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)
(explaining that Maryland's enactment of accountant-client privilege "was intended to protect the expectation of
privacy of individuals in matters involving contracts, domestic disputes, and other civil and equity controversies");
People v. Paasche, 525 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the purpose of Michigan's accountantclient privilege is "to protect from disclosure the substance of the information conveyed by the client to the
accountant" and contrasting it with the purpose of the attorney-client privilege).
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legitimate needs for such information. 33 An accountant-client privilege would
complement a right to financial privacy, which is recognized in several legislative
enactments. 34 Though these enactments do not constitute privileges, they suggest a
growing legislative awareness that indiscriminate disclosure of financial information
is unacceptable and that more limited and qualified disclosure is appropriate given
the potential for harm.
B. The Attorney-Client Privilegeand the Accountant-Client Privilege

Any discussion of an accountant-client privilege inevitably involves comparisons
with the attorney-client privilege. In contrast to the accountant-client privilege, the
attorney-client privilege is universally recognized. 35 Attorneys engage in the zealous
representation of clients within the bounds of the law and act as advocates on behalf
of their clients.36 In contrast, accountants, especially when providing auditing
services, have responsibilities beyond their clients to reasonably foreseeable third
parties who may rely upon their work.37 Further, an accountant performing an audit
must approach the task with professional skepticism and remain independent of the
client. 38 In tax compliance work, an accountant has a responsibility to the client as
well as to the federal and state taxing authorities.39
The difference in functions between an accountant and a lawyer has been the
most frequent argument against a federal accountant-client privilege. 4° An
accountant advances multiple interests in the course of serving a client, and concerns
often arise that such a privilege would shield unlawful client activity that might
otherwise be reported, which would result in increased costs of administering the tax
33. See, e.g., Valley Bank of Nev. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977, 979 (Cal. 1975).
34. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000) (exempting personal and confidential
financial information from disclosure); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000) (placing
conditions on the disclosure of customers' financial information); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6801(a) (2000) (declaring it the policy of Congress "that each financial institution has an affirmative and
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those
customers' nonpublic personal information"); In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 190 (1st Cir. 2003)
("Personal financial information, such as one's income or bank account balance, is universally presumed to be
private, not public."); Trans Union LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 295 F.3d 42, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing
privacy protections related to non-public information given to financial institutions).
35. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 388 (1981) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is the
oldest common law privilege); Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995) (explaining that, even
though its scope may vary, the attorney-client privilege is the only communications privilege recognized in every
state).
36. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984); see also N.M. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT pmbl. ("As an advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary
system."); Rule 16-107 NMRA (explaining the general rule that lawyers must ensure conflict-free representation
of clients).
37. Compare Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 746-47 (Cal. 1992) (discussing liability of
accountants to third parties), with Leyba v. Whitley, 120 N.M. 768, 772 n.l, 907 P.2d 172, 176 n.1 (1995)
(discussing liability of attorneys to third parties).
38. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing Standards No.

2, § 150 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2004).
39. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Standards for Tax
Services,
5-6 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2000) (recognizing that AICPA members have a
responsibility to the taxpayer-client and the tax system, which depends upon tax returns that are "true, correct, and
complete").
40. E.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: Ev1DENTIARy PRiVILEGES § 6.2.5, at 482-83

(2002); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 5427, at 810-11.
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system.4 Of course, while any enforceable privilege inevitably results in the loss of
relevant evidence, the issue is whether the absence of such evidence is outweighed
by the societal benefits of the privilege.
Although lawyers also serve both public and private interests in representing
clients, the balance weighs in favor of the client regarding the recognition of a
privilege that will protect a client's confidential communications with the lawyer.
Lawyers are required to advance the personal interests of their clients, but also have
duties of candor toward the court and fairness to opposing parties and counsel.4 3 In
other words, in addition to representing the client, a lawyer also has a responsibility
to the legal system to see that justice is done. Yet, despite that institutional
obligation, the lawyer has a straightforward professional responsibility not to
disclose confidential client communications related to the representation," which
is reinforced by an evidentiary privilege. 45 This suggests that accountants can have
a similar responsibility for the administration of the tax system or for financial
reporting, yet still represent clients ethically, even with an accountant-client
privilege.
Moreover, although lawyers and accountants perform different functions,
accountants' functions are at times similar to those of lawyers. For example, in
rendering tax advice, whether in transactional work, tax compliance, or
representation of clients before taxing authorities, accountants must apply the facts
of a case to the law and accomplish the client's objectives within the bounds of the
law.' This suggests that at least some protection is warranted, even if it is narrower
than the attorney-client privilege, as long as it looks to the actual tasks performed.
C. Possible Effect of an Accountant-ClientPrivilege on the Work of Accountants
Concern for the public interest dominates the debate when it comes to considering
an accountant-client privilege. This is evidenced by the fact that relatively few
jurisdictions recognize such an evidentiary privilege.47 Although arguments in favor
of an accountant-client privilege exist, significant concerns remain given recent
audit failures and auditors' responsibility to disclose, if not detect, material
misstatements in financial statements.48
41. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 5427, at 809.
42. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
43. Rule 16-303 NMRA (candor toward the tribunal); id. R. 16-304 (fairness to opposing party and counsel).
44. Id. R. 16-106(A) (confidentiality).
45. Id. R. 11-503 (attorney-client privilege).
46. See Ronald E. Friedman & Dan L. Mendelson, The Need for CPA-Client Privilege in Federal Tax
Matters, TAX ADVISER, Mar. 1, 1996, at 154 (stating that Congress has recognized that accountants and lawyers
perform the same functions before the IRS).
47. See infra note 317 (indicating that slightly less than one third of the states of the United States have a
statutory accountant-client evidentiary privilege).
48. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 699 n.3 (2005) (mentioning that Enron's
auditor allowed it to aggregate the results of special purpose entities for "'off balance sheet"' activities, clearly
violating generally accepted accounting principles); SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1035-36
(9th Cir. 2005) (noting the congressional response to "one cataclysmic corporate accounting scandal after another,
including Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco" and upholding a temporary escrow provision for the termination of
payments to officers undergoing investigation for securities fraud). For a discussion of the responsibility of auditors
to detect and disclose material misstatements in financial statements due to illegal acts, see infra notes 52-79 and
accompanying text.
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Theoretically, an accountant-client privilege encourages free and open
communication between the client and the accountant and enables the latter to better
discharge his or her professional tasks.4 9 This, in turn, should result in better
compliance with laws and professional standards regulating reporting and
disclosure. Because clients are often unaware of tax laws or accounting principles,
they should be forthcoming and not have to rely on their own judgment as to what
is relevant financial information. An accountant can better advise the client when
provided with more complete information, whether the subject of that advice is
compliance with the law or managing a business more productively.50 Clients might
be reticent to provide such information if they are concerned about outside
disclosure. 5'
On the other hand, accountants are already required to hold client affairs in
confidence, even if that confidence does not encompass an evidentiary privilege.
However, that confidence generally does not extend to information required to be
disclosed by financial reporting standards.52 Current professional standards suggest
that the trend is toward greater, rather than less, responsibility for the detection and
reporting of material misstatements in (1) financial reporting and (2) professional
engagements beyond auditing, such as assurance services, reviews, and
compilations.53 Not surprisingly, an auditor is required to consider the possibility of
illegal acts that have a direct and material effect on financial statements.54
Auditors have traditionally been required to "plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance that material misstatements, whether caused by errors or fraud,
are detected."55 Fraudulent misstatements may involve financial reporting or

49. Colo. State Bd. of Accountancy v. Zaveral Boosalis Raisch, 960 P.2d 102, 106 (Colo. 1998).
50. See Gearhart v. Etheridge, 208 S.E.2d 460, 461 (Ga. 1974).
51. Quantifying this effect could well be difficult. Cf.Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409
n.4 (1998) (discussing the scant empirical evidence on whether limiting the attorney-client privilege would reduce
client disclosure).
52. NMSA 1978, § 61-28B-24 (1999); AICPA CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 301.01(1) (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 2006).
53. See In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litigs., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 763-64 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (noting that
with the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the U.S. Congress sought to expand oversight
provided by accountants).
54. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
54, § 317.05 to .06 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989). The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) is a voluntary national organization that serves its members as well as the public interest.
Members agree to be bound by its professional pronouncements. AICPA CODEOFPROF'L CONDUCT § 202.01 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988). The Auditing Standards Board is a senior technical committee of the
AICPA that promulgates enforceable auditing standards called Statements on Auditing Standards. Those standards
were adopted on an interim basis by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a private nonprofit corporation that oversees auditors of public companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a) (Supp. 1 2002) (requiring
the PCAOB to establish auditing standards); BYLAWS AND RULES OFTHE PCAOB, R. 3200T (Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd. 2003) (adopting AICPA Auditing Standards); see also id. R. 3300T (adopting AICPA Attestation
Standards).
Under the AICPA standards, illegal acts are "violations of laws or governmental regulations" and
attributable to the entity being audited or its management or employees. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 54, § 317.02. Such acts do not include personal misconduct
by client "personnel unrelated to their business activities." Id.
55. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
107, § RAS.3 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006); see also CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 104, § RAS.2 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
2006); BYLAWS AND RULES OF THE PCAOB, Auditing Standard No. 2, 117 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.
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misappropriation of assets. 6 At times, auditors may provide services that are related
to fraud detection but are not part of an audit of the financial statements.5 7 These
services may include attestation designed to provide assurance concerning certain
behavior, including compliance with laws and regulations.5 8 These tasks require the
auditor to both gather and disclose information that might be incriminatory or
indicative of liability.
In addition to audit and attest services, accountants often perform non-attest
services, such as a compilation or review of financial statements and the issuance
of a report thereon. These engagements are not audits. A compilation is limited to
presenting information that is the representation of management in the form of
financial statements. 9 A review involves performing inquiry and analytical
procedures on financial statement data to enable an accountant to express limited
assurance that no material modifications need to be made to conform to generally
accepted accounting principles. 60 A compilation or review engagement cannot be
relied upon to disclose errors, fraud, or illegal acts, 6 but accountants are now
required to report to management any evidence or information indicative of fraud
or illegal acts that comes to their attention. 62 To the extent that accountants are
required to consider and report fraud or illegal acts, an accountant-client privilege
that would extend to such information could potentially inhibit any investigation and
reporting because an accountant would bejustifiably concerned about compromising
the client's privilege while performing such tasks. Moreover, such a broad
accountant-client privilege could suppress highly relevant information in
prosecuting fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets.
Auditors and those performing attest or consulting engagements often are
required to gather evidence to support various assertions contained in financial
statements. Consistent with professional standards, an auditor should gather
evidence to assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.63 This includes

2004); Deephaven Private Placement Trading, Ltd. v. Grant Thornton & Co., 454 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the concept of "reasonable assurance"). Fraud is defined as "an intentional act that results in a material
misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an audit." CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, § 316.05 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
2002) (footnote omitted). Fraud is distinguished from error on the basis of intent-an error results from
unintentional conduct. Id. § 316.05 n.4.
56. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
99, § 316.06.
57. Id. § 316.01 n.2.
58. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Standards for Attestation

Engagements No. 10, § 101.7(f) (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2001).
59. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Standards for Accounting
& Review Services No. 1, § 100.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1978).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 100.05(a); CODIFICATION OFACCOUNTING STANDARDS ANDPROCEDURES, Statement on Standards
for Accounting & Review Services No. 13, § 110.06(a) (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2005).
62. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Standards for Accounting

& Review Services No. 1, §§ 100.05(b), .09, .25. Under recent review pronouncements, management is now
required to acknowledge its responsibility to prevent and detect fraud as well as to disclose its awareness of fraud
or suspected fraud that could be material in financial statements. Id. § 100.32(c)-(d); see also Michael D. Akers &
Jodi L. Bellovary, FraudRequirements in SSARS 10: Practitioners'PerceptionsRaise Interesting Questions, CPA
J., Apr. 2006, at 34, 34-35; J. Russell Madray, New FraudGuidance, J. ACCT., Jan. 2006, at 51, 51-52.
63. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
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communicating with management, the audit committee, internal audit personnel, and
other client operating personnel, including those not directly involved in financial
reporting.' Such inquiry is important because it may provide individuals with an
opportunity to convey information not known by the auditor from a different
perspective than those involved in financial reporting.6 5 Often fraud is discovered
through information obtained upon inquiry, and while such information may
corroborate management's response, in some cases it will not. 66 "[F]or example, a
response from an employee indicating an unusual change in the way transactions
have been processed" may suggest an override of controls by management.67
An auditor's inquiries may be influenced by analytical procedures performed in
planning an audit and by consideration of fraud risk factors including (1) incentives
and pressures, (2) opportunities, and (3) attitudes and rationalizations.68 During the
audit, an auditor assesses the risk of material misstatement due to fraud in light of
discrepancies in the accounting records, conflicting or missing evidence, and
problematic or unusual auditor-client relationships.6 9 Once an auditor determines
that a misstatement is or may be the result of fraud and that the effect of the
misstatement is material (or it cannot be determined whether the effect is material),
the auditor may need to gather more evidence and consider the implications.7"
Consideration of the risks of material misstatement and the results of substantive
tests might indicate a need to withdraw and communicate such reasons to the audit
committee or others.7 1
Regardless of materiality, an auditor should always bring evidence of fraud to the
attention of an appropriate level of management, and if the fraud involves senior
management or is material, it should be reported directly to the audit committee.72
Depending on the understanding reached with the audit committee concerning the
nature and extent of communication, an auditor may disclose any misappropriations
of assets by lower-level employees to the audit committee.73 Thus, the extent of any

99, § 316.19 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002) (outlining procedures for gathering information). The
responsibility to perform risk assessment, design audit procedures in response, and analyze that evidence is
pervasive in auditing and makes communication with client personnel and third parties essential. See CODIFICATION
OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 109, § RAS.5, .6(a), .7, .8,
.10,. 12 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006). Members of the audit team must participate in a discussion
about "the susceptibility of the entity's financial statements to material misstatements." Id. §§ RAS. 14-.20; see also
CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, §§
316.14-18. The PCAOB recently emphasized the importance of conducting and documenting these "brainstorming
sessions" as part of the auditor's broad-based inquiry. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., OBSERVATION ON
AUDITORS' IMPLEMENTATION OF PCAOB STANDARDS RELATING TO AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT
TO FRAUD 4-5 (2007), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Inspections/Other/2007/01-22_Release2007-001.pdf.
64. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
99, §§ 316.20 to .25.
65. Id. § 316.26.

66. Id.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. § 316.35; see also id. § 316.85 (providing examples of fraud risk factors).
Id. § 316.68.
Id. § 316.77.
Id. § 316.78.
Id. § 316.79; CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing

Standards No. 114, § 20 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006).
73.

CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

fraud would normally be disclosed to senior management, the audit committee, or
both.74

The necessary interaction in an audit between the auditor, management, those
responsible for corporate governance, including the board of directors and the audit
committee,75 third parties such as customers and suppliers, as well as regulatory
authorities and the SEC, may not lend itself well to an accountant-client privilege
given an auditor's need to investigate and discuss matters with internal and external
parties. Though confidentiality is required,7 6 such investigation and discussion might
well be inhibited for fear of a waiver of any privilege and auditor liability to the
client for improper disclosure.77 Moreover, the auditor must retain a sufficient level
of independence from and professional skepticism toward the client in order to
report on management's assessment of internal control 7 and on the financial
statements themselves.79

99, § 316.79.
74. Id. § 316.82.
75. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
114, § 3(a).
76. See ALVIN A. ARENS ET AL., AUDITING AND ASSURANCE SERVICES: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 91-93

(1 th ed. 2006). For a discussion of an accounting firm's responsibility to report an audit client's possibly illegal
acts that are material to the SEC, see infra note 106.
77. Insofar as internal disclosure, to the extent that an accountant-client privilege has been analogized to the
attorney-client privilege, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that an entity's attorney-client privilege may
protect confidential communications between the attorney and high-level managerial employees, as well as midlevel and lower-level employees, provided that all have relevant information that will enable the lawyer to advise
the client. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-97 (1981). This, of course, does not address potential
waiver problems when external parties are informed of such information. See generally In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l
Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1192-1201 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the doctrine of selective waiver of attorney-client
privilege and work-product immunity where the materials sought had been furnished to the SEC and the Department
of Justice), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 584 (2006); In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C2 04 575 ALM, 2007
WL 495150, at *6-9 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591, 601-05 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (Supp. 112002) (requiring auditors of issuers to attest to management's internal
control assessment). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 contains a number of other provisions designed to strengthen
auditor independence, reaffirm corporate responsibility for accurate financial statements, and enhance financial
disclosure. See id. §§ 7231-7266; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1520(a)(1) (Supp. 112002). These restrictions apply to
registered public accounting firms that audit issuers of publicly traded securities. See infra notes 121-122 and
accompanying text. These restrictions include (1) limiting an auditor to providing audit services (rather than
allowing an auditor to provide both audit and non-audit services to an audit client), (2) audit committee pre-approval
of most audit services, (3) audit partner rotation after five years, (4) timely and informative reports by the auditor
to the audit committee, (5) a prohibition on an auditor providing audit services where certain key client personnel
were previously employed (one year prior to the initiation of the audit) by the auditor and who participated in the
audit of the client, and (6) retention of audit working papers for seven years. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g)-(l) (2000 &
Supp. 1 2002); id. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 1520; 17 C.F.R. § 2 10.2-06(a) (2006).
79. Generally, an auditor may issue one of the following types of opinions on a company's financial
statements: (1) an unqualified or "clean" opinion that "the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects,
the financial position of the Company, as of the balance sheet date, and the results of its operations and its cash
flows for the period then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles" of the United States,
(2) a qualified or "except for" opinion, (3) an adverse opinion, or (4) a disclaimer of opinion. CODIFICATION OF
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 79, §§ 508.08, .10 (Am. Inst.
of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989).
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D. Summary: Reasons in Favor Of and Against Recognizing an AccountantClient Privilege
In determining whether an accountant-client privilege exists, courts have
considered utilitarian factors and, to a limited extent, financial privacy. Utilitarian
factors include client expectations of confidentiality, the need for confidentiality to
encourage full disclosure by clients so that the accountant may better perform
assigned tasks, the value placed on the accountant-client relationship, and the
potential injury to the accountant-client relationship balanced against resolving
litigation with incomplete information. 80 The major factors favoring an accountantclient privilege are (1) an inference that clients will disclose information more freely
if they know that the confidentiality obligations of the accountant will be backed by
an evidentiary privilege and (2) better advice, reporting, disclosure, and the like will
be provided when the client does not make initial determinations of relevancy
concerning information, but rather provides complete and correct information. 8'
Factors weighing against an accountant-client privilege include (1) full and
adequate disclosure is already mandated by tax and securities laws; 82 (2) the
accountant-client privilege is not recognized in federal law (except to a limited
extent in non-criminal tax matters); 83 (3) a minority of states have such a privilegesuggesting that clients do not rely on it; 84 (4) the Supreme Court has never
recognized a right to financial privacy; (5) accountants are in the business of
preparing reports and disclosures for clients, and much of the information conveyed
by clients will become public anyway; 85 and (6) in performing auditing and other
accounting services, an accountant's duty to investigate and report material errors
and irregularities would be frustrated by a privilege that might suppress such
information.86
When compared to the attorney-client relationship, the traditional view has been
that accountants perform different functions than lawyers-accountants have
institutional responsibilities beyond the client, such as to third parties (investors and
creditors) and regulatory agencies (for example, government taxing or securities
regulation authorities), that may rely upon the accountant's work.87 But not every
function that accountants perform is destined to become public and relied upon, thus
suggesting a need for a qualified privilege that would protect the confidential nature
of accountant-client communications in those circumstances where an accountant
functions as an advisor.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26, 49-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
See infra Part M.
See infra notes 316-317 and accompanying text.
See supra note 16; infra note ItO and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55-79 and accompanying text.

87.

See supra notes 37-39; infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
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III. FEDERAL LAW REGARDING ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, privileges are largely recognized and
developed in accordance with the common law.88 In federal tax cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court has determined that an accountant-client privilege does not exist in
federal law,89 so any federal recognition of such a privilege would require either a
change in course or an affirmative legislative enactment. Although Congress has
enacted a federal tax practitioner privilege, it is of limited applicability and pertains
only to legal advice rendered by the tax practitioner. 9° Where the accountant assists
a lawyer in providing legal advice, confidential client communications between an
accountant and a client might be protected pursuant to an attorney-client privilege. 91
However, such a privilege requires that the accountant's services deal exclusively
with the offering of legal advice rather than an accounting service.9 2 In sum, federal
law offers very little protection for confidential communications between
accountants and their clients.
As enacted by Congress, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not contain provisions
specifying privileges.9 3 Though nine privileges were originally suggested (an
accountant-client privilege was not among them), 94 Congress generally provided that
non-constitutional privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason
and experience." 95 Although the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently recognized one
of the privileges not enacted by Congress (psychotherapist-patient),9 6 it has not been
receptive to a common-law development of an accountant-client privilege when
considering the issue in federal tax cases. 97 Thus, if a federal accountant-client
privilege is to exist, it must be created by statutory enactment because the common
law does not recognize it.
As a general rule, no federal accountant-client privilege exists, and federal courts
do not recognize state-created accountant-client privileges.98 It is axiomatic in the
U.S. legal system that federal privilege law controls in federal criminal and civil

88.

FED. R. EviD. 501.

89. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 335 (1973).
90. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2000).
91. See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999).
92. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000).
93. See FED. R. EViD. 501.
94. The nine proposed evidentiary privileges included (1)"required reports," (2) "lawyer-client," (3)
"psychotherapist-patient," (4) "husband-wife," (5) "communications to clergymen," (6) "political vote," (7) "trade
secrets," (8) "secrets of state and other official information," and (9) "identity of informer." FED. R. EVID. 501
advisory committee's notes. Of course, Congress could enact specific privileges if it so chose. See FED. R. EVID.
501 (providing for common-law development of evidentiary privileges except as required by the Constitution,
congressional act, or U.S. Supreme Court rules enacted pursuant to statutory authority).
95. FED.R.EviD.501.
96. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) ("[W]e hold that confidential communications between a
licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled
disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
97. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 335-36 (1973).
98. E.g., Couch, 409 U.S. at 335 ("[W]e note that no confidential accountant-client privilege exists under
federal law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in federal cases.").
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cases.9 9 In civil cases heard in federal court, only where "[s]tate law supplies the rule
of decision" on "an element of a claim or defense" (i.e., diversity cases) do courts
look to state law privileges."0 Where federal and state law claims are tried together,
the federal rule in favor of admissibility would prevail over a state law privilege not
recognized by federal law.'0 ' Where federal law incorporates elements of state law,
such as under the Federal Tort Claims Act, federal law concerning privileges
applies. 102
In contrasting the roles of attorneys and accountants, the U.S. Supreme Court has
never viewed the two as comparable and has found the offered justification for an
accountant-client privilege wanting. For example, in United States v. Arthur Young
& Co., the Court reasoned that an independent auditor's tax accrual work papers
subpoenaed pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 7602 were neither protected
by workproduct immunity nor an accountant-client privilege.0 3 The Court came to
this conclusion even though such work papers might sometimes contain the
auditor's opinion on the validity of certain transactions affecting tax liability, as well
°
as documentation supporting such an opinion.'O
The Court relied upon
congressional intent in enacting a broad subpoena power to investigate tax returns
and the auditor's public responsibility to express an opinion on the financial
statements.'0 5 The Court drew a distinction between attorneys who must remain
loyal to clients, keep confidences, and provide zealous representation and
independent accountants who have a responsibility to the public, including creditors
and investors, that transcends loyalty to the client.306

99. Federal privilege law undoubtedly applies in federal criminal cases, although state law may sometimes
be surveyed in deciding whether federal law ought to recognize a privilege. E.g., Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12 (noting that
all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege); United
States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980) (explaining that an evidentiary privilege recognized under Tennessee
state law "does not compel an analogous privilege in a federal prosecution"). In civil cases, "[w]here the interests
of the United States are directly affected and the issue or right being adjudicated derives from a federal source,"
federal privilege common law applies in the absence of a contrary enactment by Congress. See Menscs v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 942 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (D. Nev. 1996). In enacting Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Congress has provided, consistent with the concerns expressed in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), that when state law is operative by its own force, for example in diversity cases, state privilege law applies.
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 379 (3d Cir. 1990); Menses, 942 F. Supp. at 1322.
100. FED.R.EVID.501.
101. Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982). But see Garza v. Scott
& White Mem'l Hosp., 234 F.R.D. 617, 624-25 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (indicating that state privileges can apply where
the specific evidence is unrelated to the federal claims).
102. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 232 F.R.D. 191, 194-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[lI]n
cases arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act..., for example, federal privilege rules apply because, although state
law governs the substantive issues, it is only because that law has been 'absorbed' by the federal statute."); Menses,
942 F. Supp. at 1323-24 (explaining that applying "state privilege laws to Federal Tort Claims Act cases would
allow the uneven administration of the law that.. Rule 501 attempts to avoid").
103. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815-19 (1984).
104. See id. at 808, 812-13.
105. Id. at 815-17.
106. See id. at 817-18. In the auditing context, an accountant's responsibility to the public, and particularly
to the SEC, would create some tension with an accountant-client privilege because an accounting firm may be
required to report an audit client's possibly illegal acts that are material to the SEC.
Under Title Ill of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, audits of issuers must have
"procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and material
effect on the determination of financial statement amounts." 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(l) (2000). If an accounting firm
discovers a possible illegal act it must decide whether that act was likely to have occurred and determine the

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 37

In reaching its holding that tax accrual work papers are not protected by workproduct immunity, the Court rejected the notion that such immunity was necessary
"to foster candid communication between accountant and client."' 0 7 The Court noted
that such a rationale was more akin to the recognition of an accountant-client
privilege than work-product immunity and that it had previously rejected such a
privilege in Couch v. United States.' °8 In Couch, the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination does not shield a client from
producing financial records subpoenaed by the federal government when the client
had directed those records to his or her accountant for many years. 0 9 The Court
rejected such an accountant-client privilege as not having a significant justification
on Fifth Amendment grounds because (1) much of the information would be
disclosed in the return, (2) the accountant rather than the client would exercise
discretion concerning disclosure, and (3) a strong need for voluntary compliance
with federal tax laws exists.110 In sum, the Fifth Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination, but it does not apply when a third party is required to
produce a client's records."'
In 1998, seemingly in response to Arthur Young & Co. and Couch, the U.S.
Congress enacted a limited privilege between taxpayers and federally authorized tax
practitioners, which may include attorneys, CPAs, enrolled agents, and enrolled
actuaries." 2 The federally authorized tax practitioner-client privilege applies to the
extent that the same communication would be considered privileged if it were
between an attorney and the taxpayer client. 3 In other words, the privilege only
pertains to legal advice rendered by the tax practitioner. The privilege is further
limited because it only applies to federal non-criminal tax matters before the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) and in federal court." 4 Moreover, the privilege does not

potential effect of the act. Id. § 78j-1(b)(1)(A). If the accounting firm finds that an illegal act has taken place, and
it is of consequence, it must, "as soon as practicable," inform the appropriate management personnel of the issuer
and assure that the audit committee or, if there is no audit committee, its board of directors is adequately informed.
Id. § 78j-l(b)(1)(B). Once the accounting firm determines that the appropriate company entities have been
adequately informed, it must report to the board of directors in the event that (1) the illegal act is "material"; (2) "the
senior management has not taken, and the board of directors has not caused senior management to take, timely and
appropriate remedial actions"; and (3) "the failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected" to result in a
departure from the standard audit report or "resignation from the audit engagement." Id. § 78j-l(b)(2)(A)-(C). If
the company receives such a report, it must inform the SEC within one business day and also provide the same
notice to the accounting finn. Id. § 78j-l (b)(3). If the accounting firm does not receive a copy of that notice, it may
resign from the engagement or furnish a copy of its report to the SEC. id. § 78j-l(b)(3)(A)-(B). In any event, if the
firm resigns, it must furnish a copy of its report to the SEC. Id. § 78j-l(b)(4). Although the statute contains a
provision that the accounting firm is not liable in a private action for the contents of its report, the provision
envisions such information to be confidential. See id.§ 78j-1(c).
107. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817.
108. Id. (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)).
109. Couch, 409 U.S. at 334-35.
110. Id. at335-36.
111. Id.; see also SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984) ("It is also settled that a person
inculpated by materials sought by a subpoena issued to a third party cannot seek shelter in the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
112. See I.R.C. § 7525(a) (2000); see also 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2006) (listing the types of professionals that are
permitted to practice before the IRS).
113. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1); see also United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168, 170 n.1(1st Cir. 2005); United
States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999).
114. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2); see also Sylvan Siegler & Stanley P. Weiner, The Privilege and Perils of Public
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apply to written communications between federally authorized tax practitioners and
persons or entities in connection with tax shelters.115
One federal court has held that the federally authorized tax practitioner privilege
does not protect the identities of clients in response to IRS summonses concerning
tax shelters. 16 In United States v. BDO Seidman, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned that confidential communications were not at issue and, therefore,
the clients had no credible expectation of confidentiality in their identities given the
regulation and documentation requirements attendant to the promotion and sale of
tax shelters.117 This suggests a narrow construction of the privilege consistent with
prior law.
Congressional recognition of a federally authorized tax practitioner privilege
clearly does not alter the holding in Arthur Young & Co. 118 Additionally, state law
accountant-client privileges do not affect the government's summonsing authority
under the tax laws." 9 Thus, in cases involving federal law or federal administrative
proceedings, state accountant-client privileges do not apply. 20
State accountant-client privileges also do not apply in administrative proceedings
with a federal character involving the regulation of public accounting firms. The
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), 121 the agency tasked with
periodically inspecting, investigating, and disciplining registered public accounting
firms, 12 2 will not honor an accountant-client privilege in any form. 23 Documents and
information prepared or received by the PCAOB in connection with an inspection
or investigation, however, are confidential and subject to an evidentiary privilege
in state and federal proceedings. 24 Such documents and information are also exempt
from disclosure under the Freedom 26of Information Act 125 until they are released in
public or disciplinary proceedings.

Accounting, NAT'L PUB. Accr., Dec. 2000, at 8, 8.
115. I.R.C. § 7525(b); see also Francine J. Lipman & James E. Williamson, The New Accountant-Client
PrivilegeProvision:A PartialStep Forwardfor Nonattorney Tax Practitioners,NAT'L PUB. ACCT., July 1999, at
41,41.

116. United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2003).
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
119. Scotty's Contracting & Stone, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d 785, 791 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984)).
120. E.g., id.; Inspector Gen. of the U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Glenn, 122 F.3d 1007, 1012 (11 th Cir. 1997).
121. The PCAOB is a private-sector non-profit corporation that was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 to oversee audits of public companies to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the
preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (a) (Supp. II 2002).
122. Id. §§ 721 1(c)(3)-(4), 7214, 7215.
123. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., INSPECTION OF REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS A2- 16
(2003), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_006/RElease2003-019.pdf; PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BD., RULES ON INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS A2-33 (2003), available at http://www.

pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket 005/Release2003-015.pdf. The PCAOB develops rules that are submitted to the SEC
for approval. Rule 5106 provides the procedures to assert a privilege. BYLAWS AND RULES OFTHE PCAOB, R. 5106
(Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2003). Rule 4006 requires registered public accounting firms to cooperate with
the PCAOB. Id. R. 4006. The duty under Rule 4006 includes (1) "provid[ing] access to, and the ability to copy, any
record in the possession, custody, or control of such firm or person" and (2) "provid[ing] information by oral
interviews, written responses, or otherwise." Id.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(5)(A).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(5)(A).
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Presently, federal law offers very little evidentiary protection for accountantclient communications. Accountant-client communications, however, may be
considered privileged "if they meet the traditional requirements of the attorneyclient privilege."' 127 Thus, when a client reveals confidential information to an
accountant who is assisting a lawyer (in the provision of legal advice) as 2a8
specialized agent, the client may be able to invoke the attorney-client privilege.
This distinction is important because "the expertise of an accountant often is
necessary,29 or highly useful, to an effective consultation between client and
lawyer."1
What is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer. If what is sought is
not legal advice but only accounting service .... or if the advice sought is the
accountant's rather than the lawyer's, no privilege exists. 3 '
If confidential communications to accountants performing tax compliance work
do not qualify for any privilege, the question remains whether the privilege exists
regarding confidential communications to attorney-accountants performing the same
work. Generally, clients of attorney-accountants cannot rely upon an attorney-client
or an attorney work-product privilege to prevent disclosure of documents or
confidential communications incident to return preparation. 3 ' The current state of
the law is that all return preparation is generally viewed as an accounting service,
even if the client's information is provided
for the dual purpose of preparing the
32
return and for use in future litigation.
If an accountant produces documents involving client communications solely in
anticipation of litigation, such materials might be protected from discovery under
work-product immunity, particularly if the accountant is working under the direction
of a lawyer.'3 3 "[T]he mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories

127. Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 246 (lst Cir. 2002).
128. See id.
129. Aull v. Cavalcade Pension Plan, 185 F.R.D. 618, 629 (D. Colo. 1998) (citing United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961)).
130. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 (citations omitted).
131. E.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) ("To rule otherwise would be to
impede tax investigations, reward lawyers for doing nonlawyers' work, and create a privileged position for lawyers
in competition with other tax preparers....").
132. Id. at 501; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The preparation
of tax returns is an accounting service, not the provision of legal advice."); Corby Brooks, A Double-EdgedSword
Cuts Both Ways: How Clients of Dual Capacity Legal PractitionersOften Lose Their Evidentiary Privileges, 35
TEX. TECH L. REv. 1069 (2004) (arguing in favor of a privilege for clients of attorney accountants).
133. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 513 (2d Cir. 1979) (concluding that accountants' work
papers reflecting oral conversations with corporate employees after a law firm was retained to assist in the general
counsel's investigation qualified as work product).
Of course, to the extent that he or she will testify as an expert witness at trial, the accountant's testimony
and the basis for it must be disclosed and supplemented if additional or corrective information comes to light. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)-(C), (e)(l); see also Thompson v. Doane Pet Care Co., 470 F.3d 1201, 1203-04 (6th Cir.
2006); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 817 n.2 (8th Cir. 2002). If the accountant is
consulted as an expert witness in anticipation of litigation but is not expected to testify at trial, an opposing party
may obtain discovery only "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable.. to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(4)(B); see also Durflinger v. Artiles,
727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984).
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of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation"' 34
contained in documents or other tangible things are considered opinion workproduct and should be afforded the greatest protection-they are either absolutely
immune from discovery or discoverable only upon compelling need.' 35 That having
been said, non-opinion fact work-product may be discoverable based upon a
showing of substantial need by the party seeking discovery and an inability to obtain
the substantial equivalent through other means. 136 Thus, work-product immunity,
which does not protect the facts or opinions themselves, provides far more uncertain
protection than a privilege and, of course, may be subject to waiver through
disclosure. 37 Although one federal appellate court has held that quality control
assessments prepared by an accounting firm for a client are protected by workproduct immunity, 38 work-product immunity is a narrower concept than an
accountant-client privilege and involves only qualified immunity from discovery of
documents or other tangible things. 139
While some persuasive arguments may be made in favor of a federal accountantclient privilege, not the least of which is enabling accountants to better represent
their clients, such an expansion of federal law has not been well-received.' 40 Still,
even recognizing the limitations in this area, an accountant must consider whether
an attorney should direct the accountant's provision of services in certain cases
where litigation is anticipated; otherwise, the confidential communications between
the accountant and client are almost surely not protected by any evidentiary
privilege.14 ' Because a functional approach is used, any confidential client
communications, whether made to a lawyer, a lawyer-accountant, or an accountant
working for a law firm, must relate to the provision of legal advice rather than an
accounting service.

134. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

135. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,511-12 (1947); In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179,
1186 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 584 (2006); Frontier Refining, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d
695, 704 (10th Cir. 1998). Of course, in the context of a federal tax investigation, the U.S. Supreme Court has
rejected the concept of an accountant-client work-product immunity that would prevent disclosure of an auditor's
"tax accrual workpapers" pursuant to subpoena. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 (1984).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
137. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 240 (1975); In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1186; In re Echostar
Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
138. PepsiCo, Inc., 305 F.3d at 817.
139. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 246-52; In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 437 (6th Cir. 1997).
140. See, e.g., Emily Jones, Comment, Keeping Client Confidences: Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
ProductDoctrine in Light of United States v. Adlrnan, 18 PACE L. REv. 419, 428-33, 456-59 (1998) (discussing
federal court rejections of an accountant-client privilege and concluding that arguments against the privilege
outweigh arguments in favor of it); Thomas J. Molony, Note, Is the Supreme Court Ready to Recognize Another
Privilege?An Examination of the Accountant-Client Privilege in the Aftermath of Jaffee v. Redmond, 55 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 247 (1998) (concluding that the federal system is not ready to recognize an accountant-client
privilege in ight of federal precedent and the fact that the majority of states do not have such a privilege); Michael
Wilson, Note, Careful What You Wish for: The Tax Practitioner-ClientPrivilege Established by the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuringand Reform Act of 1998, 51 FLA. L. REv. 319 (1999) (discussing potential problems
with the federally authorized tax practitioner-client privilege).
141. See Ferko v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 125, 138-40 (E.D. Tex. 2003)
(explaining that documents given to an accountant for advice in anticipation of litigation with the SEC were
protected by the attorey-client privilege); see also Carl Pacini et al., Attorney-Client Privilege: CPAs and the EFrontier,J. ACCT., Apr. 2004, at 64, 64 (suggesting ways in which CPAs can preserve the attorney-client privilege).
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IV. NEW MEXICO LAW CONCERNING
ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Similar to federal law, in New Mexico when a client reveals confidential
information to an accountant assisting a lawyer in providing legal advice as 14a2
specialized agent, the client ought to be able invoke the attorney-client privilege.
Another possibility for a person in such a position would be to limit discovery by
asserting work-product immunity. 43 But New Mexico also has a legislatively
enacted accountant-client privilege that seemingly offers protection for confidential
communications independent of an attorney directing the accountant." New
Mexico courts would likely declare this statutory accountant-client privilege invalid
as a rule of procedure because in New Mexico, rules of evidence, including
privileges, are procedural matters generally within the sole province of the New
Mexico Supreme Court. 145 Thus, legislatively enacted evidentiary privileges that are
not recognized or required by the New Mexico Constitution or the rules of the New
Mexico Supreme Court are invalid and therefore not recognized. 46 Although some
judges and commentators have criticized this unique position,' 47 it remains a
formidable barrier to the operation of New Mexico's statutory accountant-client
privilege. Although the New Mexico Supreme Court recently declared that it would
consider legislative enactments pertaining to privilege that are consistent with

142. See Rule 11-503(A)-(B) NMRA.
143. New Mexico courts have defined attorney "work product [as] material prepared in anticipation of civil
litigation by a party, a party's attorney, and other people employed by a party." State ex rel. Brandenburg v.
11, 110 P.3d 66, 69. Rather than a privilege, the work-product rule provides
Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-008,
immunity from discovery. Id. There are two types of work product: opinion work product and non-opinion work
product. Id.; Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 1997-NMCA-032, 1 19, 937 P.2d 979, 984. Opinion work product consists
of the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning.. litigation." Rule 1-026(B)(4) NMRA. Opinion work product enjoys virtually absolute immunity in
civil litigation. Brandenburg, 2005-NMSC-008, 12, 110 P.2d at 69. Non-opinion work product is discoverable
"only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to the obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means." Rule 1-026(B)(4) NMRA; accord Brandenburg, 2005-NMSC-008, 12, 110 P.2d at
69. Materials containing confidential client communications prepared by an accountant for litigation might thus
enjoy either absolute or qualified immunity from discovery depending upon the circumstances.
Of course, to the extent that the accountant will testify as an expert witness at trial, his or her opinions
and the basis for them must be disclosed and supplemented if corrective information comes to light. Rule 1026(B)(5), (E) NMRA. Even if the accountant is not expected to testify, his or her opinion and the basis for it may
be discoverable upon a showing of exceptional circumstances demonstrating that the party seeking discovery cannot
obtain the facts or opinions by other means. Id. R. 1-026(B)(6).
144. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C) (1973).
145. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 312, 551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1976) ("[U]nder our
Constitution the Legislature lacks power to prescribe by statute rules of evidence and procedure, this constitutional
power is vested exclusively in this court....").
146. Id.
147. E.g., Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 37, 40-43, 791 P.2d 788, 791, 794-97 (1990) (Montgomery, J.,
dissenting) (urging that statutes that implement legislative policies apart from regulation of the courts should be
upheld and that Ammerman should be overruled); Sw. Cmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 201, 755 P.2d
40, 45 (1988) (Scarborough, C.J., dissenting) (urging the overruling of Ammerman insofar as it held statutory
evidentiary privileges unconstitutional); Michael B. Browde & M.E. Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the
JudicialRule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Needfor PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M. L. REv. 407 (1985);
Note, Evidence-Newsman's Privilege-LegislativelyEnacted Newsman's Privilege Invalid as Infringement on
JudicialRule-Making Power-Arnmerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1254 (N.M. 1976), 1977 BYU
L. REv. 493.
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existing supreme court or constitutional privileges,'4 8 it is unlikely that the
accountant-client privilege has a counterpart in either the New Mexico Constitution
or the New Mexico Supreme Court rules, so the court would likely find the
accountant-client privilege invalid.
A. Statutory Privilege
The New Mexico privileged communications statute provides:
In the courts of the state, no certified public accountant or public accountant
shall be permitted to disclose information obtained in the conduct of any
examination, audit or other investigation made in a professional capacity, or
which may have been disclosed to said accountant by a client, without the
consent in writing of such client or his, her or its successors or legal representatives.'49

As originally enacted in 1880, the section now containing this accountant-client
privilege included only a marital communications privilege. 150 A 1933 amendment
added several other5 privileges: attorney-client, priest-penitent, doctor-patient, and
accountant-client. '
Before addressing the validity of the statutory accountant-client privilege, it is
important to consider how it might operate in light of New Mexico court decisions.
In Ash v. H.G. Reiter Co., 5 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that only the
client may assert the accountant-client privilege. 53 Ash involved a dispute over a
bonus provision in an oral contract of employment. 54 The employee prevailed at the
trial court level, and on appeal the defendant-employer claimed that the testimony
of its accountant was privileged and erroneously admitted. 55 The employee used the
accountant's testimony to establish the defendant-employer's gross profit upon
which the bonus was based. 156 The accountant had prepared annual reports and had
audited the employer's records. 57 The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the
defendant-client's assertion of the accountant-client privilege as to his accountant's
testimony at the appellate level because the client had not asserted it at the trial court
148. Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 9 8-9, 120 P.3d 820, 823.
149. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C) (1973).
150. Act of 1880, ch. 12, 1880 N.M. Laws § 7.
151. Act of Feb. 25, 1933, ch. 33, 1933 N.M. Laws 35. Today, the statute contains three privileges: a marital
communications privilege, an attorney-client privilege, and an accountant-client privilege. NMSA 1978, § 38-66(A)-(C). Additionally, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted rules of evidence concerning a marital
communications privilege and an attorney-client privilege. See Rule 11-505 NMRA (husband-wife privilege); id.
R. 11-503 (attorney-client privilege).
152. 78 N.M. 194, 429 P.2d 653 (1967). Ash did not consider the validity of the state accountant-client
privileges at issue. See infra note 160.
153. Ash, 78 N.M. at 196, 429 P.2d at 655; accordFed. Ins. Co. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328,
331 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that Tennessee's statutory accountant-client privilege is "personal to the client"). In this
regard, the attorney-client privilege is similar; the privilege belongs to the client or his or her representative. Rule
11-503(C) NMRA. However, in New Mexico the person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication may
assert the privilege, but only on behalf of the client. Id.; Hunter v. Kenney, 77 N.M. 336, 338-40, 422 P.2d 623,
625-27 (1967).
154. Ash, 78 N.M. at 195, 429 P.2d at 654.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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"' The court implied, however, that the trial court might have properly
level. 58
excluded the accountant's testimony if the client had raised a timely objection."5 9
The court held that, absent a contemporaneous objection, the accountant's testimony
was admissible. 6°
Traditionally, most evidentiary privileges, because they are in derogation of the
common law, have been strictly construed, which has resulted in several exceptions
to their application. For example, in Indiana, blanket assertions of privileges are not
sufficient, and the party claiming one has the burden to prove its applicability on a
question-by-question or document-by-document basis. 61 New Mexico's accountantclient privilege provision appears to apply to "information" that the accountant
a
learns in the course of "any examination, audit or other investigation made in 62
1
accountant.
the
to
discloses
client
the
that
information
to
or
capacity"
professional
The provision concerning client disclosure might not be restricted to disclosures in
the course of "any examination, audit or other investigation made in a professional
capacity"'' 63 because such a construction would render the client disclosure language
unnecessary. If interpreted otherwise, the terms "examination, audit or other
investigation"'' could substantially limit the privilege.
At the same time, limits may exist about what type of confidential information
might be protected because accountants provide assurance and tax services that
might be beyond the scope of the statute. 65 The term "information"" should surely
be interpreted to mean "confidential information," as the rationale for the privilege
depends upon the need for confidentiality. 167 The provision applies "in the courts of
this state," thereby suggesting application in criminal and civil proceedings. 68 In

158. Id. at196, 429 P.2d at 655.
159. See id.
160. Id. Ash is probably more noteworthy as an application of the contemporaneous objection rule rather than
as an exposition of the limits of the accountant-client privilege. The contemporaneous objection rule provides that,
absent plain error affecting substantial rights, a party must object to the admission of evidence to preserve the issue
for appeal. See Rule 11-103(A), (D) NMRA.
161. Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind. 1996) (observing that "courts disfavor
blanket claims of privilege").
162. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C) (1973).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2002) (construing the
Illinois accountant-client privilege as not encompassing communications made in the course of an accountant
performing non-financial consulting services).
166. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C).
167. See State v. Teel, 103 N.M. 684, 686, 712 P.2d 792, 794 (Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the limits of New
Mexico's marital communication privilege contained in the same statute as the accountant-client privilege); see also
Vellone v. First Union Brokerage Servs., Inc., 203 F.R.D. 231, 233-34 (D. Md. 2001) (construing "communication"
as "confidential communication" in Maryland's accountant-client privilege statute); Capps v. Wood,718 P.2d 1216,
1219-20 (Idaho 1986) (construing "communication" as "confidential communication" in Idaho's accountant-client
privilege statute). Like the attorney-client privilege, only client communications with accountants that are intended
to be confidential and for the rendition of professional services seem to be protected under New Mexico's law. Cf
Rule II-503(A)(4) NMRA (defining "confidential communication" for attorney-client privilege); id. R. 11-503(B)
(explaining that the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications); Diversified Dev. & Inv., Inc.
v. Heil, 119 N.M. 290, 295-96, 889 P.2d 1212, 1217-18 (1995) (construing New Mexico's attomey-cient
privilege).
168. See NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C).
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some jurisdictions, however, accountant-client privilege does not extend to criminal
and bankruptcy proceedings. 6 9

In considering how the New Mexico accountant-client privilege might operate,
waiver and survival are concepts that appear to be addressed by the terms of the
statute, thereby necessitating less reliance on decisions from other jurisdictions.17
The statute indicates that the privilege can be waived by the written consent of the
"client or his, her or its successors or legal representatives."'' This suggests that the
accountant-client privilege survives the death of the client. 172 Additionally, the
statute provides that if the client offers himself as a witness and voluntarily testifies
about the communications, the client has waived the privilege and has consented to
the accountant's examination.' 7 3
Other limitations may also exist regarding the accountant-client privilege. These
include the assertion of the privilege by a corporation when shareholders seek such
information, waiver by conduct, suits against an accountant, the crime-fraud
exception, using the accountant as a conduit to shield information, and matters
involving professional licensure and discipline. 74 When shareholders of a closely
held corporation seek, in good faith, to obtain information conveyed to the
accountant by the corporation or by fellow shareholders, the privilege may not apply
because the corporation, in engaging the accountant, is deemed to be acting on
behalf of all of the shareholders. 175Moreover, to the extent that an accountant jointly
represents clients who later become involved in a controversy involving the joint
representation, the common interest of the clients allows for disclosure of
conversations between the accountant and the clients 176 but not to third parties. The
privilege remains intact as to disclosure to third parties unless the conversation has

169. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-749(A) (2002); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROc. § 9-110(d)

(LexisNexis 2006); State v. O'Brien, 601 P.2d 341, 348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); In re A Special Investigation # 202,
452 A.2d 458, 461 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
170. See NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C).
17 1. Id. New Mexico provides for waiver, by less formal means, of the various privileges recognized by its
rules of evidence, including the attorney-client privilege, which can be waived simply by voluntary disclosure or
consent to disclosure by the holder of the privilege. Rule 11-511 NMRA; Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 2000NMCA-077, H 10-29, 10 P.3d 166, 169-75.
172. See generally Denise P. Lindberg, Comment, The Accountant-Client Privilege: Does It and Should It
Survive the Death of the Client?, 1987 BYU L. REV. 1271. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that the attorneyclient privilege survives death. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 404-10 (1998); accord Rule
I1-503(C) NMRA (describing that personal representatives or successors in interest may claim the attorney-client
privilege).
173. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(D) ("If a person offers himself as a witness and voluntarily testifies with reference
to the communications specified in this section, that is a consent to the examination of the person to whom the
communications were made as above provided.").
174. See infra notes 175-182 and accompanying text.
175. See Neusteter v. Dist. Court, 675 P.2d 1, 5-6 (Colo. 1984); Pattie Lea, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 423 P.2d 27,
30 (Colo. 1967). Because an entity like a corporation must speak through its agents, administration of an entity's
testimonial privilege may present "special problems" in determining who has the power to speak on behalf of and
waive any privilege. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
(determining that the bankruptcy trustee of a corporation could waive attorney-client privilege as to pre-bankruptcy
communications).
176. Pattie Lea, Inc., 423 P.2d at 30; cf.Rule 11-503(D)(5) NMRA (explaining that there is no attorney-client
privilege when the communication in question is made in the course of joint representation).
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been disclosed 77to a party other than one of the clients involved in the joint
representation. 1
Like all privileges, an accountant-client privilege is subject to waiver by conduct,
including a client's disclosure of information or consent to disclose information to
third parties. 17 8 The client may also waive the privilege when the client, as part of
a claim or defense in a lawsuit, relies upon a matter involving the accountant's
advice or services. 79 An accountant-client privilege is also subject to the crimefraud exception, which provides that communications made in furtherance of a fraud
(before it occurs) are not privileged. 80 Finally, a client may not shield information
that he or she would otherwise be obligated to disclose by communicating it or
transferring it to an accountant.' 8' Some statutory accountant-client privileges
contain lists of exceptions where the privilege does not apply, and most of 82those
make exceptions for matters involving professional licensure and discipline.
Admittedly, the New Mexico appellate courts' interpretation of New Mexico's
accountant-client privilege is sparse, especially considering that for twenty-six years
New Mexico had two statutory accountant-client privileges. In addition to the
current statutory privilege, 83 the New Mexico Public Accountancy Act of 1947
contained an accountant-client privilege that only the accountant could assert.184 The
Act provided:
A certified or registered public accountant shall not be required by any court to
divulge information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his con-

177. See Zepter v. Dragisic, 237 F.R.D. 185, 189 (N.D. MI. 2006) ("The [Illinois] accountant-client privilege
does not extend to matters which are disclosed to a third party.").
178. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 714 A.2d 188, 194 (Md. 1998); see also Rule 11-511 NMRA
(explaining that evidentiary privileges may be waived by voluntary disclosure or consent to such disclosure). One
seeking the disclosure of apparently privileged documents based upon waiver has the burden of proof in showing
that the privilege was actually waived. E.g., Eight Hundred, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 837 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
179. Nashville City Bank & Trust Co. v. Reliable Tractor, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 709, 712 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Savino
v. Luciano, 92 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1957); Gussin, 714 A.2d at 194. This may occur in disputes between a
professional's client and third parties. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 2000-NMCA-077, 15, 10 P.3d 166,
171. It may also occur between the client and the professional. See Rule 11-503(D)(3) NMRA (explaining that no
attorney-client privilege exists for communication involving breach of duty of lawyer or client); id.R. 1 -504(D)(3)
(explaining that no physician/psychotherapist-patient privilege exists for communications relevant to a patient's
claim or defense); Trujillo v. Puro, 101 N.M. 408,413, 683 P.2d 963,968 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that jurisdictions
that recognize a physician-patient privilege find a waiver for health and medical history placed in issue by a
plaintiff).
180. Rose v. Commercial Factors of Atlanta, Inc., 586 S.E.2d 41, 42-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); see also Rule
11-503(D)(1) NMRA (describing New Mexico's crime-fraud exception in its attorney-client privilege).
181. Paper Corp. of Am. v. Schneider, 563 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Gussin, 714 A.2d
at 196; McNair v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 885 P.2d 576, 579-80 (Nev. 1994).
182. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.316(4)(a)-(c), (5) (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-3-32(b)(l)-(4)
(2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203A (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:86 (2000); IDAHO R. EvwD. 515(d) (2006);
LA. CODE EV1D. ANN. arts. 515(C), 516, 517 (2006). New Mexico's attorney-client privilege contains a similar
exception in claims of breach of duty by attorneys or clients. Rule 1 -503(D)(3) NMRA. Additionally, an attorney
may disclose information relating to a client's representation in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.
Id. R. 16-106(D).
183. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C) (1973).
184. See Ash v. H.G. Reiter Co., 78 N.M. 194, 196,429 P.2d 653,655 (1967) (citing Dorfman v. Rombs, 218
F. Supp. 905 (D. IM.1963)) (relying upon the construction of a similar Illinois statute).
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fidential capacity as such, provided, however, that the provisions of this section
85
shall not apply to auditing under the supervision of the State Comptroller.
While New Mexico state appellate courts have not recently interpreted the current
statutorily created accountant-client privilege, other courts have referenced it in
reported decisions. In Lukee Enterprises,Inc. v. New York Life Insurance Co.,186 a
New Mexico federal district court sitting in diversity recognized both New Mexico
accountant-client privileges and quashed a scheduled deposition of the plaintiff's
accountant.'8 7 Importantly, in 1973, the accountant-client privilege provision
originating in the New Mexico Public Accountancy Act of 1947 was repealed.'88
Additionally, a California federal district court sitting in diversity in 1995 declined
to apply the remaining New Mexico accountant-client privilege (section 38-6-6(C)),
reasoning that, although the accountant was deposed in New Mexico, the.underlying
action was pending in California, and a choice-of-law provision applied California
law, which lacked an accountant-client privilege. 89 Similarly, a New Mexico federal
district court referenced a plaintiff' s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief based
upon the New Mexico accountant-client privilege, but the court remanded the
removed action to state court for want of a federal question.' 90 While these three
reported cases discuss New Mexico's current accountant-client privilege, they were
only decided based on the issues before the court and do not address whether the
asserted accountant-client privilege would have been enforceable.
B. Questionable Validity of the Statutory Privilege
In 1933, a little more than two weeks after enacting the current accountant-client
privilege, the New Mexico legislature passed an enabling act providing that the New
Mexico Supreme Court could promulgate rules to "regulate pleading, practice and
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts of New Mexico, for the purpose of
simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon
its merits."' 9' This enactment would become the first step toward the supreme
court's dominant position in rule making, including the rules of evidence and
privileges.' 92 The questionable validity of the remaining New Mexico accountantclient privilege became readily apparent in a series of cases decided by the New
Mexico Supreme Court beginning in 1976. In Ammerman v. HubbardBroadcasting,
Inc.,'193 the court determined that a journalist-newscaster privilege enacted by
statute' 94 was a legislative attempt to create a rule of evidence and ruled that the

185. New Mexico Public Accountancy Act of 1947, ch. 115, 1947 N.M. Laws 187.
186. 52 F.R.D. 21 (D.N.M. 1971).
187. Id. at 22-23; see also FED. R. EvID.501 (explaining that in civil actions where state law provides the rule
of decision, it also determines the applicable privileges).
188. Act of Mar. 29, 1973, ch. 223, 1973 N.M. Laws 813.
189. Platypus Wear, Inc. v. K.D. Co., 905 F. Supp. 808, 812-13 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
190. Salman v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1236-39 (D.N.M. 2005).
191. Act of Mar. 13, 1933, ch. 84, 1933 N.M. Laws 147, 148 (codified as amended at NMSA 1978, § 38-11(A) (1966)).
192. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, Il1 N.M. 336, 340-41, 805 P.2d 603, 607-08 (1991).
193. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
194. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-7 (1973).
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attempt was invalid.' 95 The court also determined that the legislature had no power
to prescribe the procedure by which an appeal could be taken from a district court
order directing disclosure of a source. 196
In invalidating the statutory privilege, the New Mexico Supreme Court based its
opinion on two grounds. First, the court held that rules of evidence, including
privileges, are rules of procedure, which are within the court's exclusive
constitutional power to promulgate.197 In doing so, the court relied on the New
Mexico constitutional provisions establishing the judicial branch and granting the
supreme court the power of superintending control over inferior courts."8 Since the
enactment of the statutory enabling act, which provides that the court is to regulate
"pleading, practice and procedure,"' 99 the modem New Mexico Supreme Courtuntil its August 2005 decision in Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer 2° °
-has regarded such power as inherent, largely exclusive, and resting upon
constitutional grounds.20 '

195. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359.
196. Id. at 312-13, 551 P.2d at 1359-60.
197. Id. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358. Consistent with the "truth-seeking" function of judicial proceedings, all
witnesses must produce evidence and testify, and exceptions to that important principle that are not otherwise
provided by the state constitution are exclusively subject to the discretion of the New Mexico Supreme Court. State
v. Gonzales, 1996-NMCA-026, 13, 912 P.2d 297, 301.
198. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311, 551 P.2d at 1358 (relying on N.M. CONST. arts. HI, § 1,VI, § 3). Article
Ill, section I of the New Mexico Constitution establishes the separation of powers and provides:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any powers
properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution otherwise expressly
directed or permitted.
N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 1. Article VI, section 3 grants the New Mexico Supreme Court authority over lower courts
and provides, "The supreme court... shall have a superintending control over all inferior courts...." Id. art. VI, § 3.
199. NMSA 1978, § 38-1-1(A) (1966).
200. 2005-NMSC-032, 120 P.3d 820.
201. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 310-11, 551 P.2d at 1357-58. The supreme court's dominant position in rule
making arises from an enabling act which provided:
Section 1. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico shall, by rules promulgated by
it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all
courts of New Mexico, for the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy
determination of litigation upon its merits. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the
substantive rights of any litigant. The Supreme Court shall cause such rules to be printed and
distributed to all members of the bar of the State of New Mexico and to all applicants, and the
same shall not become effective until thirty days after they have been so printed, made ready for
distribution and so distributed.
Section 2. All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure, now existing, shall, from
and after the passage of this Act, have the force and effect only as rules of court and shall remain
in effect unless and until modified or suspended by rules promulgated pursuant hereto.
Act of Mar. 13, 1933, ch. 84, 1933 N.M. Laws 147, 147-48 (codified as amended at NMSA 1978, §§ 38-1-1 (1966),
38-1-2 (1933)). Three years after its enactment, this provision was challenged on separation of powers grounds as
an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 400, 60 P.2d 646, 648
(1936). In Roy, the defendant challenged a short form information charging him with murder pursuant to rules
promulgated by the supreme court. Id. at 402-04, 409, 60 P.2d at 651-53, 658. The supreme court upheld the
provision and its power to adopt rules:
When the legislature enacted chapter 84, it merely withdrew from a field wherein it had
theretofore functioned as a co-ordinate branch of our government with the court in the
promulgation of rules of pleading, practice, and procedure. Whether the legislative branch of the
government was ever rightfully in the rule-making field, or was a mere trespasser or usurper,
need not now be determined.
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Second, in Ammerman, the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on New Mexico's
rule of evidence 11-501, which pertains to privileges. Rule 11-501, which went into
effect on July 1, 1973, explains that no person may claim a privilege except as
provided or required by the New Mexico Constitution or by rule of the New Mexico
Supreme Court.20 2 No provision in the current enactment of the New Mexico Rules

Id. at 411, 60 P.2d at 660. In so holding, the court recognized its inherent power to prescribe such rules, but because
no conflict existed between legislative and judicial rules, the court declined to decide which branch, legislative or
judicial, would prevail in such a conflict. Id.
In 1960, the supreme court promulgated the following rule, which now appears as a rule of civil procedure:
All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in any of the
courts of New Mexico, existing upon the taking effect of the act of the eleventh legislature,
approved March 13, 1933, and all statutes since enacted by any session of the legislature relating
to said subjects, or any of them except as any of said statutes heretofore may have been or
hereafter may be amended or vacated by order of this court, shall remain and be in effect and
have full force and operation as rules of court.
Rule 1-091 NMRA (citation omitted); see also Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 340, 805 P.2d 603,
607 (1991). Although this rule might be interpreted to provide that legislatively enacted privileges (such as the
accountant-client privilege) are valid in the district courts until the New Mexico Supreme Court amends or vacates
the rule, the supreme court views the rule as dovetailing with the 1933 rules enabling act. Mendez, Ill N.M. at
340-41, 805 P.2d at 607-08. According to the court, the rule "reflects a consistent intention on the part of the
legislature and this Court that legislative rules relating to pleading, practice and procedure in the courts, particularly
where those rules relate to court management or housekeeping functions, may be modified by a subsequent rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court." Id.
In several cases thereafter, the supreme court determined that judicially prescribed rules control when a conflict
exists-in other words, the legislative provision is invalid. See, e.g., Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 36, 791 P.2d
788, 790 (1990) (holding that a court rule allowing an appeal from Workers' Compensation actions prevailed over
contrary statutory language); State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246-47, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008-09 (1975)
(explaining that in a quo warranto proceeding, a court rule that did not require naming the person rightfully entitled
to office prevailed over a statute that required such naming); Sw. Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 109-10,
452 P.2d 176, 178-79 (1969) (reasoning that a court rule prescribing a shorter time period for when a dismissal for
want of prosecution could be had prevailed over a longer statutorily mandated time period); State ex rel. Bliss v.
Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 160-61, 315 P.2d 223, 227-28 (1957) (noting that repealing a statute that provided for
jury trials in all contempt proceedings did not conflict with the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to
trial by jury because the statute was invalid as an intrusion on the judiciary's power to regulate direct criminal
contempt); State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 312-13, 183 P.2d 845, 846-47 (1947) (holding that a court rule
establishing a three-month time limit for an appeal prevailed over a statute establishing a six-month period). But
see State v. Alvarez, 113 N.M. 82, 85, 823 P.2d 324, 327 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a statute establishing a tenday time period for an appeal prevailed over a court rule establishing a thirty-day period because the type of appeal
contemplated was not one of constitutional right).
The rule, however, is not absolute. To the extent that a substantive right is involved, the court rule must yield.
Eturriaga v. Valdez, 109 N.M. 205, 209-10, 784 P.2d 24, 28-29 (1989) (concluding that a statute establishing a
thirty-day time period for an election challenge prevailed over a court rule providing for fifteen days because the
time period represented a substantive right). When a statute, though regulating pleading, practice, or procedure, does
not conflict with any rule adopted by the supreme court, it might still be given effect. E.g., Albuquerque Rape Crisis
Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032,
14, 120 P.3d 820, 825 (considering a statutory rape counselor-victim
privilege); Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779 (1973) (considering a statute providing
grounds for writ of certiorari); State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 13, 582 P.2d 384, 390 (Ct. App. 1978) (considering a
rape shield law).
Finally, in an effort to avoid constitutional questions (i.e., whether the legislature is empowered to enact rules),
certain statutes and rules that overlap have been harmonized. See, e.g., Mendez, 111 N.M. at 339-41, 805 P.2d at
606-08 (discussing a statutory time limit placed on filing an interlocutory appeal and the silence in the supreme
court rules regarding the same); Madrid v. Univ. of Cal., 105 N.M. 715, 718, 737 P.2d 74, 77 (1987) (explaining
that a construction of the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act that required "expert medical testimony" was
not exclusive to licensed medical doctors and did not conflict with the supreme court's rule of evidence regarding
expert witnesses).
202. Rule 11-501 NMRA. New Mexico's rule of evidence 11-501 went into effect on July 1, 1973 and
provides:
Except as otherwise required by constitution, and except as provided in these rules or in other
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of Evidence provides for legislatively enacted privileges. On the contrary, the
current rules of evidence abrogate any privilege that does not fit within the
framework of Rule 11-501.za Thus, evidentiary privileges under New Mexico state
law are those expressly provided for or required by the New Mexico Constitution,
the rules of evidence, or other rules of the New Mexico Supreme Court. °4 Such
privileges apply to all stages of litigation-from discovery to trial. 20 ' The second
rationale for invalidating the statutory journalist-newscaster privilege in Ammerman
was fundamentally derivative of the first-the New Mexico Supreme Court's
adoption of the rules of evidence omitted any role for the legislature to create, or the
common law to develop, evidentiary privileges. °6
In Ammerman, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the statutory
journalist-newscaster privilege was (1) constitutionally invalid and (2) unenforceable in judicial proceedings. 2 7 The court, however, expressed no opinion regarding
whether the statutory privilege could "be asserted in any proceeding or investigation
before, or by any legislative, executive or administrative body or person. 2 8 In
1982, roughly six years after its ruling in Ammerman, the New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted a narrower news media-confidential source privilege, which includes
procedures for claiming the privilege and for appealing adverse determinations. 2°9
Until recently, the New Mexico state appellate courts regularly relied upon
Ammerman in rejecting evidentiary rules of admissibility 210 as well as claims of
privilege not recognized specifically by the New Mexico Constitution, the rules of
evidence, or other rules of the supreme court.2 ' In State ex rel. Attorney General v.
First JudicialDistrict Court, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the
New Mexico Constitution required executive privilege, 2 which led it to

rules adopted by the supreme court, no person has a privilege to:
A. refuse to be a witness; or
B. refuse to disclose any matter; or
C. refuse to produce any object or writing; or
D. prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object
or writing.
Id.; see also Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311-12, 551 P.2d at 1358-59 (relying on Rule 11-501 to support the conclusion
that the legislature may not enact evidentiary rules or privileges).
203. Trujillo v. Puro, 101 N.M. 408, 413, 683 P.2d 963, 968 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that no privileges
are recognized except for those that are "specifically delineated" in the New Mexico Constitution or in the rules of
evidence).
.204. E.g., State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 96 N.M. 254, 260, 629 P.2d 330, 336 (1981);
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 2000-NMCA-077, I 11, 10 P.3d 166, 170.
205. Rule 11-1 101(C) NMRA.
206. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 311-12, 551 P.2d at 1358-59.
207. Id. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359.
208. Id.
209. Rule 11-514 NMRA.
210. See Miller & Assocs. v. Rainwater, 102 N.M. 170, 171, 692 P.2d 1319, 1320 (1985) (invalidating a
statutory provision allowing for proof of a duly verified open account to be offered into evidence without the need
for the book of original entry where the truth of the account is not directly denied under oath); State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Holguin, 95 N.M. 15, 17, 618 P.2d 359, 361 (1980) (invalidating a statutory provision allowing proof of the
contents of a hydrographic survey based upon a signed and filed report by the state engineer to be offered into
evidence).
211. State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 96 N.M. 254, 257, 629 P.2d 330, 333 (1981).
212. Executive privilege is a qualified privilege that protects communications between members of the
executive branch from disclosure based on the need for candor in decision-making and separation of powers
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affirmatively recognize such a qualified privilege with respect to the state attorney
general.213 But the court rejected the "public interest privilege"2" 4 proposed by the
attorney general (and based on common law) because it did not have support in
either the state constitution or in the state rules of evidence.215 The court observed
that, although New Mexico's rules are patterned after the federal rules of evidence,
an important difference is that the common law does not govern New Mexico's rules
regarding privileges.2" 6 On the contrary, the adoption of New Mexico's rules of
evidence 2in17 1973 resulted in the abrogation and inapplicability of common law
privileges.

New Mexico courts have also rejected privileges that might have been
legislatively implied, even if they were not expressly called "privileges." In Maestas
v. Allen,21 8 the supreme court did not recognize a privilege based upon a statute
providing that a mother and an alleged father could not be compelled to give
evidence as to paternity. 2 9 The court's rationale mirrored that of Ammerman-the
supreme court's constitutional position and the current enactment of the rules of
evidence do not permit legislatively enacted privileges. 22' For similar reasons, the
court of appeals in Trujillo v. Puro221 rejected a statutory ethical rule precluding a
physician from revealing a professional secret as a basis for asserting the physicianpatient privilege. 222 A psychotherapist/physician-patient privilege subsequently

concerns. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 383-84 (2004) (vice-presidential privilege); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974) (presidential privilege); State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 96 N.M. at 258, 629 P.2d
at 334 (state attorney general privilege); see also Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n,
532 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2001) (discussing the common law deliberative process privilege designed to generally protect the
decision making of executive officials).
213. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 96 N.M. at 257-58, 629 P.2d at 333-34.
214. In this context, a "public interest privilege" is a qualified privilege that protects confidential
communications between government officials, and also between private persons and government officials, when
the public interest would be harmed if the material were disclosed. See In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 709
N.E.2d 452, 455-56 (N.Y. 1999); Cirale v. 80 Pine Street Corp., 316 N.E.2d 301, 303--04 (N.Y. 1974); Doe v.
Riback, 788 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593-95 (App. Div. 2005); see also CAL. EvID.CODE § 1040 (West 1995).
215. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 96 N.M. at 258-61, 629 P.2d at 334-37.
216. Id. at 260, 629 P.2d at 336. The Federal Rules of Evidence are promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court
as assisted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, but Congress may reject or modify those rules, which
it did with respect to the privilege rules. E.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1996) (recognizing a privilege
between a psychotherapist and her patient); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (recognizing a
spousal privilege that allows one to refuse to testify against his or her spouse). As enacted by Congress, Rule 501
provides that privilege "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501. Rather than restricting the
development of privileges to a particular court or time period, the federal approach allows federal courts to
recognize common-law privileges and their respective evolutions. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9.
217. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 96 N.M. at 260, 629 P.2d at 336.
218. 97 N.M. 230, 638 P.2d 1075 (1972).
219. Id. at 231, 638 P.2d at 1076.
220. Id.
221. 101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1984).
222. Id. at 413, 683 P.2d at 968; see also Salazare v. St. Vincent Hosp., 96 N.M. 409,412-13, 631 P.2d 315,
318-19 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the state medical malpractice act did not create a privilege for medical-legal
panel members and that any such privilege would be invalid under Ammerman), rev'd in part, St. Vincent Hosp.
v. Salazar, 95 N.M. 147, 619 P.2d 823 (1980) (upholding the court of appeals' determination that the statutory
privilege applied to the medical review commission with respect to panel deliberations and reports but not to
testimony heard by the panel).
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rules
of evidence through the auspices of the supreme
became part of New Mexico's 22
3
court's rule-making authority.

A case of particular relevance to the statutory accountant-client privilege is State
v. Teel224 because, as in Ammerman, a legislatively enacted privilege was in
question. In Teel, the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that the statutory marital
communication privilege,225 which appears in the same section of the New Mexico
statutes as the accountant-client privilege,226 was broader than that recognized by the
rules of evidence and therefore did not apply.227 The statutory privilege extended the
privilege to "any communication" during the marriage ,228 whereas the corresponding
rule of evidence privilege restricted it to confidentialcommunications. 229 Accordingly, the court did not use the broader statutory privilege to decide the case.23 °
Interestingly, in Southwest Community Health Services v. Smith,23 1 the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that a statute making medical peer review records nondiscoverable in civil proceedings did not create an evidentiary privilege. 2 The court
reasoned that the statute did not benefit a particular party, but rather it benefited the
health and safety of the community, and confidentiality was essential for the peer
review process to function.233 However, the court held that such confidential
or defense.234
information was discoverable only if it was critical to a party's23claim
5
invalid.
been
have
would
it
privilege,
a
Had the statute created
The supreme court's dominance in this area rests first upon the distinction
between substance and procedure and then upon the superintending authority of the
supreme court. Generally, courts lack the power to create substantive law (although
they may modify the common law), and a court rule that conflicts with a substantive
statutory provision must yield to the statutory provision. 236 Generally, "substantive
law creates, defines, or regulates rights while procedural law outlines the means for
enforcing those rights, 237 but substance and procedure often overlap, particularly
when it comes to evidentiary privileges that, in addition to precluding the use of
certain evidence in a particular case, are designed to serve broader social goals.238

223. See Rule 11-504 NMRA.
224. 103 N.M. 684, 712 P.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1985).
225. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(A) (1973).
226. Id. § 38-6-6(C).
227. Teel, 103 N.M. at 685-86, 712 P.2d at 793-94.
228. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(A) (emphasis added).
229. Teel, 103 N.M. at 685, 712 P.2d at 793 (citing Rule 11-505 NMRA).
230. Id.
231. 107 N.M. 196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988).
232. Id. at 198-99, 755 P.2d at 42-43; see also State v. Rickard, 118 N.M. 312, 314, 881 P.2d 57, 59 (Ct.
App. 1994) (assuming without deciding that the statutory privilege against disclosure of social records of
probationers and parolees would be constitutional presumably because of reasons for such privilege), rev'd in part,
118 N.M. 586, 884 P.2d 477 (1994).
233. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 107 N.M. at 198-99, 755 P.2d at 42-43.
234. Id. at 200-01, 755 P.2d at 44-45.
235. Id. at 199, 755 P.2d at 43.
236. State v. Valles, 2004-NMCA-1 18, 1 14, 143 P.3d 496, 501 ("[W]hen a statute conflicts with a Supreme
Court rule on a matter of procedure, the Supreme Court rule prevails, and the statute is not binding."); see also
Eturriaga v. Valdez, 109 N.M. 205, 209, 784 P.2d 24, 28 (1989) ("It is not the province of this Court to invalidate
substantive policy choices made by the legislature.").
237. State ex. rel. Gesswein v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769, 770, 676 P.2d 1334, 1335 (1984).
238. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) ("Except at the extremes, the terms 'substance'
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In the case of an accountant-client privilege, a legislature seems no less competent
than a court to weigh competing policy choices, such as the value of full and
forthright client disclosure against potential loss of relevant evidence, and enact or
reject such a privilege.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's long-held view of its exclusive power
concerning evidentiary privileges underwent some change in the last few years. In
Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer,239 the court declared that a
legislatively enacted privilege protecting information exchanged between a victim
and a victim counselor during the course of treatment" should be given effect
because it was consistent with the psychotherapist-patient privilege24 ' that the
supreme court had affirmatively enacted by rule.242 The court announced that its
prior decisions did not categorically prohibit the legislature from enacting statutes
granting a privilege as long as the statute did not conflict with an existing
constitutional privilege or a supreme court rule concerning privilege.243 In rejecting
an argument that its rule-making power is exclusive, the court explained that it had
"ultimate rule-making authority" and suggested that its prior cases were merely an
attempt to ensure its supremacy in the event of a conflict between legislative and
judicial rules. 2 " It characterized its holding in Ammerman as "narrow" and identified
the "conflict" in that case as between a statutory journalist-newscaster privilege and
Rule 11-501 of New Mexico's rules of evidence, recognizing only privileges
adopted by the supreme court or the constitution. 245 "The conflict existed because
[the New Mexico Supreme] Court had not adopted a confidential source
privilege. ' ' 246 The supreme court then observed that Ammerman "did not discuss
what the result would have been had there been a court rule recognizing or requiring
a confidential
source privilege" and suggested that State v. Herrera provided the
24 7
answer.

2 48 the New Mexico Court of
In State v. Herrera,
Appeals upheld a limited rape
shield law providing that evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct was not
admissible unless it was material to the case and its prejudicial nature did not
outweigh its probative value.249 In response to the defendant's argument that only
the supreme court could promulgate such a rule, the court of appeals stated: "The

and 'procedure' precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they mean in a particular context is
largely determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn."); see also Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34,
40, 791 P.2d 788, 794 (1990) (Montgomery, J., dissenting) (criticizing "substance" versus "procedure" as masking
the real inquiry, which ought to be whether the statute in some way deprives the court of the ability to perform its
essential adjudicative functions or interferes with the efficient and effective operations of the court).
239. 2005-NMSC-032, 120 P.3d 820.
240. NMSA 1978, § 31-25-3(A) (1987); see also id. § 31-25-2(A) (1987) (defining "confidential
communication" as including that "which is disclosed in the course of the counselor's treatment of the victim for
any emotional or psychological condition resulting from a sexual assault or family violence").
241.

Rule ll-504NMRA.

242. Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr.,
2005-NMSC-032,
243.

Id. I 11, 120 P.3d at 824.

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. 5, 120 P.3d at 822.
Id. 6-7, 120 P.3d at 822-23.
Id. 17, 120 P.3d at 823.
Id.
92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 11-13, 582 P.2d at 388-90.

1, 120 P.3d at 821.
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legislation may not be binding upon the Supreme Court but, nevertheless, is to be
given effect until a conflict exists."2 5 The court of appeals noted that the statute
merely applied New Mexico's Rule 11-403, which allows for the exclusion of
relevant evidence if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice, to past sexual conduct evidence." 1 As such, the legislative provision did
not conflict with the rules of evidence promulgated by the supreme court.252
In Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center, the supreme court developed a new test for
determining when a legislatively created rule of procedure might be given effect:
First, if a privilege is not recognized or required by the New Mexico
Constitution or court rule, then the Legislature may not enact such a privilege
because to do so would conflict with Rule 11-501. Second, if a privilege is
recognized or required by the Constitution or court rule, and the Legislature
enacts a privilege affecting arguably the same subject matter, we analyze the
statutory privilege to determine whether it is consistent with the purpose of the
constitutional or court rule privilege. If the statutory privilege is consistent, both
are given effect because the court rule recognizing a privilege is more specific
than Rule 11-501 and the court rule is expanded only within the boundaries of
is
its purpose. If the statutory privilege is not consistent, the statutory privilege
253
not given effect and the constitutional or court rule privilege prevails.
The supreme court then compared the victim-counselor privilege with the broader
psychotherapist-patient privilege 254 and concluded that both had similar purposes:
protecting confidential client communications made in the course of treatment of
emotional or psychological conditions. 25 5 The court also concluded that similar
private and public interests justified both privileges.25 6 Protecting confidential
communications from involuntary disclosure, so necessary to counseling and
psychotherapy relationships, serves private interests, 257 and effective treatment of
the underlying conditions and reporting of sexual abuse advances the public
interest. 258 Looking at how the privilege functions, the court stated, "It would make

little sense for victims of rape to be deprived of the privilege because they seek help
from victim counselors at a rape crisis center, while victims with the resources 2to
59
seek help from a licensed psychologist would benefit from the privilege.
Ultimately, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether the victim's statements to the counselors were made in the course of
treatment for an emotional or psychological condition due to a sexual assault, thus
coming within the protection of the legislatively enacted privilege. 2' Additionally,
the supreme court referred the issue of a victim-counselor privilege to its Rules of

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 13, 582 P.2d at 390.

Id. at 12, 582 P.2d at 389.
Id.; accord Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr., 2005-NMSC-032, (H 7-13, 120 P.3d at 823-24.
Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr., 2005-NMSC-032, 11, 120 P.3d at 824.
Rule 11-504 NMRA.
Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr., 2005-NMSC-032, 13, 120 P.3d at 824.
Id. U 15-17, 120 P.3d at 825-26.
Id.
Id. 13-15, 120 P.3d at 824-25.
Id. 7 17, 120 P.3d at 826.
Id. 21, 120 P.3d at 827.
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Evidence Committee for discussion and public input concerning the breadth of any
such potential supreme court rule evidentiary privilege.261
In an eloquent dissent, Chief Justice Bosson characterized the New Mexico
Supreme Court's opinion in Albuquerque Rape CrisisCenter as "wrong on the law,
wrong on policy, and grossly unfair" to the criminal defendant in the case.262
Drawing from the text of previous cases and Rule 11-501, the dissent explained how
the court had disregarded thirty years of precedent "that [the New Mexico Supreme]
Court, and only [the New Mexico Supreme] Court, may create a testimonial
privilege., 263 The dissent's reading of Ammerman and Rule 11-501 is certainly more
natural than the one offered by the majority because it is confirmed by the dozens
of cases that have considered the parameters of the supreme court's authority over
procedure.264 Though recognizing the possibility of a more conciliatory policy vis-Avis the legislature, the dissent suggested that a more direct approach would be to
amend Rule 11-501 to recognize legislatively created privileges or to change the
interpretation of that rule and overrule Ammerman. 265 The dissent defended the
supreme court's exclusive power in the area of testimonial privilege on several
grounds apart from stare decisis, including separation of powers, ease of application,
and the authority of the judicial branch over compelled testimony.2M The dissent
also recognized that the court's approach invited the legislature to act regarding
matters of evidentiary privilege.2 67 In anticipating problems with the application of
the new rule, the dissent pointed out that the supreme court had never recognized a
rape counselor privilege and that application of this new rule in the case at hand
would violate the defendant's constitutional right to be tried based on the rules in
effect at the commencement of his case.268
A year after Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer was decided, the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that it would not recognize a privilege in local law
enforcement investigatory materials.269 In Estate of Romero ex rel. Romero v. City
of Santa Fe, the parents of a missing child sued the City of Santa Fe, its police
department, and a police officer for negligent investigation concerning the child's
disappearance. 270 The parents sought discovery of the police department's
investigation files.271

The Romero opinion was delivered with a firm but conciliatory tone concerning
the balancing of policies of the legislature and the rules of the court with respect to

261. Id. 19, 120 P.3d at 826-27.
262. Id. 23, 120 P.3d at 827 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting).
263. Id. 7 24, 120 P.3d at 827.
264. See supra note 201.
265. Albuquerque Rape CrisisCtr., 2005-NMSC-032, N 32-33, 120 P.3d at 829.
266. Id. (H 33-35, 120 P.3d at 829.
267. Id. 9132, 120 P.3d at 829.
268. Id. 9 36, 120 P.3d at 829-30. The New Mexico Constitution guarantees that "[n]o act of the legislature
shall affect the right or remedy of either party, or change the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case."
N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 34. The majority dismissed this argument by pointing out that the date of enactment of the
legislative victim-counselor privilege was 1987, which predated the offense and prosecution in the case at hand.
Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr., 2005-NMSC-032, 120, 120 P.3d at 827.
269. Estate of Romero ex rel.Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMSC-028, 1 11-14, 137 P.3d 611,615-16.
270. Id. 1 1, 137 P.3d at 613.
271. Id.
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privileges.272 While identifying compelling reasons for recognizing a privilege for
law enforcement investigatory materials, the court did not retreat from its position
of recognizing only privileges contained in the state constitution, rules of evidence,
or other rules of the court.273 In holding that neither the state constitution nor the
state rules of evidence provided such a privilege, the supreme court noted that
separation of powers and executive privilege, which are inherent in the state
constitution, do not apply'27to
municipalities and that it had previously rejected a
"public interest privilege. 4 Turning to the rules of evidence, the court considered
two similar privileges contained in those rules: one that protects reports required by
law when the law provides a privilege and one that protects the identity of
informants. 275 But the court required greater correspondence between the similar
privileges and the privilege that it was asked to recognize: "[W]hile our Rules of
Evidence do provide some protection for individual pieces of investigatory materials
and information, these rules do not afford complete protection from disclosure of all
ongoing criminal investigative materials obtained by law enforcement., 276 Lacking
a basis in the state constitution or the rules 27of
evidence, the court was "unable to
7
recognize the existence of such a privilege.

Following the approach taken in Southwest Community Health Services v.
Smith,278 which sought to accommodate the interests of the legislature and those of
the court, the Romero court held that the Inspection of Public Records Act created
immunity from the discovery of such records.279 The immunity was not absolute,
and the court prescribed a balancing test-weighing the need for discovery in a
private lawsuit against the public interest in confidentiality of certain law
enforcement records. 280 The court also referred the need for a law enforcement
privilege to its Rules of Evidence Committee for discussion and review.281
The decisions in Albuquerque Rape CrisisCenterand Romero recognize that the
application of the New Mexico Supreme Court's rule-making power to legislative
enactments ought to be measured rather than categorical. Albuquerque Rape Crisis
Centerdid not go so far as to recognize all privileges enacted by the legislature, but
rather only those that have some analog in existing constitutional or court-rule
privileges. Further, such legislative privileges must be consistent with, and must not
conflict with, the constitutional or supreme court-created privilege, an approach that
was reaffirmed in Romero.2 2

272. See id. 17, 137 P.3d at 617 ("While we have superintending control over procedures used in the courts,
the legislature describes the public policies of the state through statutes.").
273. Id. 8, 137 P.3d at615.
274. Id. 13, 137 P.3d at 616. For a discussion of a "public interest privilege," see supra note 214.
275. Romero, 2006-NMSC-028, 14, 137 P.3d at 616 (citing Rules 11-502, 11-510 NMRA).
276. Id.
277. Id. On remand, however, the trial court was instructed to consider the applicability of other state rules
and policies to determine whether some of the materials in question could remain confidential. See id. 9[119-22,
137 P.3d at 618-19.
278. 107 N.M. 196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988).
279. Romero, 2006-NMSC-028, 17, 137 P.3d at 617 (relying upon NMSA 1978, § 14-2-1(A)(4) (2005)).
280. id. 9N 19-21, 137 P.3d at 618-19.
281. Id. 22, 137 P.3d at 619.
282. Id. 111, 137 P.3d at 615.
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Because no obvious analog exists in the constitution or in the supreme court's
rules of evidence, this requirement is problematic regarding the statutory
accountant-client privilege. Of course, the difference between a good lawyer and a
great lawyer is imagination, and perhaps one of the existing rules might arguably be
deemed to cover the same subject matter as the accountant-client privilege.283 In
very limited circumstances, the attorney-client privilege might be deemed to cover
similar subject matter, at least when the accountant is working at the direction of the
lawyer. 284 Apart from those specific circumstances, Romero suggests that the court
will look to other enactments concerning the subject matter of the privilege to
ascertain legislative policy,285 which in this instance is apparent in the 1999 New
Mexico Public Accountancy Act.286

Another difficult question is whether the supreme court would adhere to the
notion that, by enacting the rules of evidence in 1973 with no apparent legislative
participation, it had the power to repeal the few statutorily based rules of evidence
previously adopted by the legislature. That notion is more consistent with the view
that the legislature not only lacks any role in formulating new privileges (regardless
of the broader social implications of those rules), but also that the legislature 287
is
powerless to accept, reject, or modify those privileges recognized by the court.
Unlike a court's interpretation of the common law or a statute with which the
legislature does not agree, the legislature may not "overrule" the court through
legislation if the privilege is deemed procedural.288 In sum, Albuquerque Rape Crisis
Center portends change in the area of evidentiary privilege and may make it easier
to convince New Mexico courts to consider the accountant-client privilege on its
merits because it recognizes that some legislative enactments can be harmonized
with the rules of evidence.

283. "[I]t seems a long step from a lawyer-client privilege to a tax advisor-client or accountant-client
privilege. But if one recharacterizes it as a 'legal advisor' privilege, the extension seems like the most natural thing
in the world." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 20 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the prototypical
evidentiary privilege, the attorney-client privilege, is based on the professional status of the attorney, not on the
broad area of advice).
284. Where an accountant is employed to assist a lawyer in the rendition of legal services to a client,
communications between the client and the accountant in furtherance of the lawyer's rendition of those services,
as well as between the lawyer and the accountant for that purpose, should be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See Rule 11 -503(A)-(B) NMRA.
285. Romero, 2006-NMSC-028, 118, 137 P.3d at 618.
286. NMSA 1978, § 61-28B-24 (1999).
287. The New Mexico Supreme Court's categorical approach to privilege in Ammerman did not escape notice
by commentators: "The New Mexico Supreme Court has taken what most students of procedure would consider
a high-handed attitude of denigrating legislative competence in this field. Its position that privileges are strictly
procedural rather than substantive and thus not amenable to legislative action is in the extreme minority." JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET E. BERGER, 2 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE

UNITED STATES COURTS AND STATE COURTS [ 501[07], at 501-95 to -96 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1996)
(footnote omitted).
288. For example, New Mexico's rape shield law is plainly a rule of evidence, but the statute enacted by the
legislature in 1975 specifically provided that the statutory provisions were as matters "of substantive right." Act of
Apr. 3, 1975, ch. 109, 1975 N.M. Laws 394, 399. In State v. Herrera,the court of appeals was not swayed by the
identification of the statute as substantive, but rather held that the statute's provisions could be given effect absent
a conflict with a rule adopted by the supreme court even though those statutory provisions were not binding upon
the supreme court. 92 N.M. 7, 12, 582 P.2d 384, 389 (Ct. App. 1978). Finding no conflict, the court enforced the
statutory provisions. Id. The supreme court later expressly adopted a similar evidentiary rule. Rule 11-413 NMRA.
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Still, the cases make apparent the primacy of the privileges found in the rules of
evidence as opposed to statutory enactments.2 89 This applies to evidentiary
privileges, including testimonial privileges.2"9 The court of appeals has similarly
suggested that the rules of evidence, not the common law, govern the waiver of any
privilege. 29' The state rules of evidence contain a very thoughtful approach to
privileges through uniform draftsmanship, first considering pertinent definitions, the
general rule of the privilege, who may claim the privilege, and exceptions to the
privilege.292 The rules also contain safeguards to protect those privileges, including
protection in case of erroneously compelled disclosure or lack of opportunity to
claim the privilege.293 The state rules expressly provide that a court is not permitted
to comment upon a claim of privilege (i.e., no inference may be drawn from such
a claim) and jury cases are to be conducted so that the jury has no knowledge of
claims of privilege. 294 Noticeably absent from the privileges contained in the state
rules of evidence, however, is an accountant-client privilege. Moreover, as discussed
below, an accountant-client privilege may be in some tension with other legislative
and regulatory enactments concerning accountants.
C. Ethical Responsibilitiesof New Mexico Accountants
New Mexico's statutory accountant-client privilege, requiring written consent of
the client prior to the disclosure of information obtained in the course of an audit or
investigation or communicated to the accountant by a client,2 95 imposes a more
absolute obligation on accountants and may be inconsistent with certain other provisions regulating accountants. For example, although the 1999 Public Accountancy
Act discourages the disclosure of confidential communications between an
accountant and a client,296 it does not create a privilege.297 The statute specifically
provides that a CPA "shall not voluntarily disclose information communicated to
him by the client relating to and in connection with a service rendered to the client
by him" and "[s]uch information shall be deemed confidential. 29 8 Of course, a

289. See Rule 11-502 NMRA (required written reports privileged by statute); id. R. 11-503 (lawyer-client
privilege); id. R. 11-504 (physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privilege); id. R. 11-505 (husband-wife
privileges); id. R. 11-506 (communications to clergy); id. R. 11-507 (political vote cast in secret); id. R. 11-508
(trade secrets); id. R. 11-509 (communications to juvenile probation officers and social service workers); id. R. 11510 (identity of informer); id. R. 11-514 (news media-confidential source or information).
290. State v. Brown, 1998-NMSC-037, 61, 969 P.2d 313, 330.
291. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 2000-NMCA-077, 1 14, 10 P.3d 166, 171.
292. See, e.g., Rule 11-503 NMRA (lawyer-client privilege).
293. Id. R. 11-512.
294. Id. R. 11-513.
295. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C) (1973).
296. Id. § 61-28B-24 (1999).
297. Cf.Trujillo v. Puro, 101 N.M. 408, 412, 683 P.2d 963, 967 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a statutory
provision precluding a physician from divulging a professional secret was an ethical constraint, not an evidentiary
privilege).
298. The statute provides in full:
Except by permission of the client for whom a certificate or permit holder performs a service or
the heir, successor or personal representative of the client, a certificate holder shall not
voluntarily disclose information communicated to him by the client relating to and in connection
with a service rendered to the client by him. Such information shall be deemed confidential;
provided that nothing in this section shall prohibit the disclosure of information required to be
disclosed by a standard of the public accounting profession in reporting on the examination of
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communication may be confidential (i.e., not intended to be disclosed to third parties
except for a specified purpose) without necessarily being privileged (i.e., protected
from compelled disclosure). That seems to be the import of this section of the
Act-though information might be confidential, "nothing in this section
shall.. .prohibit disclosure in a court proceeding. 299 Other exceptions include (1)
disclosure required by a financial reporting standard, (2) disclosure in an
investigation or proceeding pursuant to the Public Accountancy Act, (3) disclosure
in an ethical investigation by a private professional organization, (4) disclosure in
the course of a peer review, (5) disclosure to a person (on a need-to-know basis)
active in the private professional organization performing a service for the client, or
(6) disclosure to a person in the entity needing the information solely for the purpose
of assuring quality control. 300 This statutory provision is based upon section 18 of
the Uniform Accountancy Act, the commentary to which explains that the Uniform
Act recognizes the confidentiality of client communications "without, however,
extending it to the point of being an evidentiary privilege."30 1 Many other states have
similar provisions that recognize the confidentiality of accountant-client
30 2
communications but also provide exceptions for disclosure in court proceedings.
Even if the New Mexico provision in section 38-6-6(C) did somehow create an
accountant-client privilege, the exceptions could arguably result in the waiver of any
such privilege.
Administratively, New Mexico requires its CPAs to conform to (1) the Code of
Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and (2)
state rules.303 CPAs are expected, within the constraints of client confidentiality, to
be honest and candid.3 °4 Specifically, "[a] member in public practice shall not
disclose any confidential client information without the specific consent of the
client., 305 This rule is subject to similar exceptions contained in New Mexico

a financial statement or prohibit disclosure in a court proceeding, in an investigation or
proceeding pursuant to the 1999 Public Accountancy Act, in an ethical investigation conducted
by a private professional organization or in the course of a peer review, or to another person
active in the organization performing a service for that client on a need-to-know basis or to a
person in the entity who needs this information for the sole purpose of assuring quality control.
NMSA 1978, § 61-28B-24 (citation omitted).
299. Id.
300. See id.; 16.60.4.10 NMAC.
301. UNIF. ACCOUNTANCY AcT § 18 cmt. (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 4th ed. 2005), available
at http://www.aicpa.org/download/statesUAA_2005_Fourth._Edition.pdf. The commentary suggests that treating
accountant-client communications as a privilege "would prevent.. disclosure in court in certain circumstancesessentially, those in which the licensee is not a party, such as divorce proceedings where one of the parties is a client
of the licensee." Id.
302. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.04.662 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-281j (West 1999); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 542.17 (West 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325.440 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 12279
(1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 87E (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. 326A. 12 (West 2004); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 73-33-16(2) (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-50-402 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 309-B: 18 (LexisNexis
2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:2B-65 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-02.2-16 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 673.385
(2003); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9.1 la (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-3.1-23 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 82 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.04.405 (West 2005).
303. 16.60.5.8 NMAC.
304. AICPA CODE OF PROF'L CoNDucT § 54.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006).
305. id. § 301.01. This rule further provides:
This rule shall not be construed (1)to relieve a member of his or her professional obligations
under rules 202 [ET section 202.01] and 203 [ET section 203.01], (2) to affect in any way the
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statutory law, including the obligation to comply with a validly issued and
enforceable subpoena and summons. 3"
A strong argument can be made that New Mexico's accountant-client privilege
has been impliedly repealed by the more specific, and perhaps contrary, confidential
communications provision in the 1999 Public Accountancy Act. 30 7 That provision
prohibits voluntary disclosure of engagement-related client communications and
deems them confidential but at the same time makes it clear that nothing in the
provision "shall.. .prohibit disclosure in a court proceeding."3 8 In contrast, the
statutory accountant-client privilege generally prohibits such disclosure in state
courts without written consent of the client.3 °9 Implied repeals are not favored
31
because the legislature is presumed to act with the awareness of existing law, 1
which in this case was the statutory accountant-client privilege. Moreover, perhaps
the legislature would be deemed aware that the statutory accountant-client privilege
was ineffective as a legislatively created privilege. Nevertheless, "when two statutes
are inconsistent, the latter enactment repeals the former by implication to the extent
of the inconsistency. ' 31' As such, to the extent that the confidential communications
provision in the 1999 Public Accountancy Act is more specific, that specificity
could be construed to control over the more general 1933 statutory provision. 312 The
objective must be to give effect to legislative intent; when provisions can be
construed harmoniously, they should be.31 3 One way to harmonize the two statutes
at issue with respect to communications between accountants and clients would be
to apply the directive concerning the non-creation of the privilege literally. In other
words, the directive would only apply to the confidential communications provision

member's obligation to comply with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or summons, or
to prohibit a member's compliance with applicable laws and government regulations, (3) to
prohibit review of a member's professional practice under AICPA or state CPA society or Board

of Accountancy authorization, or (4) to preclude a member from initiating a complaint with, or
responding to any inquiry made by, the professional ethics division or trial board of the Institute
or a duly constituted investigative or disciplinary body of a state CPA society or Board of
Accountancy.
Members of any of the bodies identified in (4) above and members involved with

professional practice reviews identified in (3) above shall not use to their own advantage or
disclose any member's confidential client information that comes to their attention in carrying
out those activities. This prohibition shall not restrict members' exchange of information in
connection with the investigative or disciplinary proceedings described in (4) above or the
professional practice reviews described in (3) above.
Id. For an excellent discussion of this rule, see ARENS ET AL., supra note 76, at 91-93.
306. Compare AICPA CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 301.01, with NMSA 1978, § 61-28B-24 (1999).
307. NMSA 1978, § 61-28B-24.

308. Id.
309. Id. § 38-6-6(C) (1973).
310. Kahrs v. Sanchez, 1998-NMCA-037, 24, 956 P.2d 132, 136.
311. Hall v. Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 106 N.M. 167, 168, 740 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1987). In Hall, the
supreme court found repeal by implication where the conflict was "apparent and irreconcilable." Id. The conflict
was between the Wrongful Death Act, enacted in 1882, which prohibited a personal representative from using
proceeds to satisfy a decedent's creditors, and the Hospital Lien Act, enacted in 1961, which allowed a hospital to
assert a lien on such proceeds. Id.
312. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. N.M. State Corp. Comm'n, 93 N.M. 719, 721, 605 P.2d 227, 229
(1979).
313. T-N-T Taxi, Ltd. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 2006-NMSC-016, 1 7, 135 P.3d 814, 817.
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in the 1999 Public Accountancy Act and not to the statutory accountant-client
privilege.
V. NEED FOR CLARITY
Accountants may presently be compelled to give testimony or produce
documents, including work papers, by way of a summons or a subpoena. To the
extent that the transactions are of interest in federal civil, criminal, or administrative
proceedings, it is unlikely that a client would be able to claim an accountant-client
privilege in such testimony or documents except with respect to legal advice
rendered by an accountant in tax matters under I.R.C. section 7525. Given that many
engagements handled by accountants involve federal law, the existence or nonexistence of a state accountant-client privilege is irrelevant because, in general,
federal law31does not recognize such a privilege nor does it recognize state-created
privileges. 311
But not every accounting engagement and subsequent litigation involves federal
law. For example, though there may be federal aspects, divorce proceedings, probate
and estate administration, corporate governance, an action for partition or an
accounting, and state tax administration are primarily state law matters. Because of
this, a state accountant-client privilege may have real value to a client if recognized
in state proceedings. Though New Mexico's accountant-client privilege statute dates
back to 1933, a statute cannot be ignored solely because of its age. The problem
with New Mexico's accountant-client privilege is that it was probably either
abrogated by the enactment of New Mexico's rules of evidence or was beyond the
power of the legislature to enact under prevailing views concerning the limited role
of the legislature in rulemaking. Notwithstanding, the accountant-client privilege
represents a policy choice by the legislature, although one that may be disregarded
based on separation of powers concerns.3 15
The accountant-client privilege is hardly universal, but some of New Mexico's
neighbors have statutory accountant-client privileges.3 16 A decided minority, less
than one third of the states of the United States, have statutory accountant-client
evidentiary privileges. 317 The New Mexico accountant-client privilege statute, by its

314. See supraPart III.

315. Cf. Estate of Romero ex rel. Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMSC-028, 17, 137 P.3d 611, 617
("While we have superintending control over procedures used in the courts, the legislature describes the public
policies of the state through statutes.").
316. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(l)(f)(1) (West 2005).
317. Quantifying the number of states that have evidentiary accountant-client privileges, as opposed to
provisions merely requiring confidentiality, requires statutory analysis in light of state decisional law. For example,
New Mexico appears to have a testimonial accountant-client privilege, but it is probably unenforceable given state
decisional law. See supraPart IV. A number of states (perhaps fifteen or sixteen) appear to have accountant-client
privileges that could be asserted to limit an accountant's testimony or production of other evidence. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 32-749; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(l)(f)(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.5055, 473.316 (West 2006);
GA. CODE ANN. § 43-3-32 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203A (2004); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 450/27 (West
1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-2.1-14-1 (LexisNexis 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 86(a)(1) (2000); MD. CODE
ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 9-110 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 339.732 (West 2004); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 326.322 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.185 (LexisNexis 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1-116
(1997); IDAHO R. EvtD. 515(b) (2006); LA. CODE EviD. ANN. arts. 515(C), 516, 517 (2006). Courts have recognized
the privileges created by most of these statutes. See State v. O'Brien, 601 P.2d 341, 348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Colo.
State Bd. of Accountancy v. Zaveral Boosalis Raisch, 960 P.2d 102, 105-06 (Colo. 1996); Paper Corp. of Am. v.
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terms, applies only to court proceedings-it is prefaced with the words, "In the
courts of this state. ' 31 8 Even assuming a broader application, if administrative

proceedings progressed to judicial proceedings, the privilege would be of
questionable validity.
The legislature could address the apparent invalidity of New Mexico's statutory
accountant-client privilege either by seeking a constitutional amendment allowing
it to create rules of evidence or by repealing the present, but potentially ineffective,
statutory privilege. 319 A successful constitutional amendment or repeal would clearly
apprise lawyers, accountants, and the public of whether a privilege, or some lesser
degree of protection, exists and what information is considered privileged.32 °
Ideally, New Mexico's two statutory provisions that address accountant-client
communications, sections 38-6-6 and 61-28B-24, should be integrated so that they
are consistent. Though the court's decision in Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center
suggests some flexibility and its decision in Romero suggests deference to
legislative policy expressed in statutes, it is unlikely that the New Mexico Supreme
Court will retreat from its position that evidentiary privileges that are not recognized
by the New Mexico Constitution or supreme court rule are procedural and therefore
exclusively within the court's discretion to enact. That said, however, cooperation
between the legislature and the supreme court in resolving apparent conflicts
between statutory evidentiary3 21privileges and the current system of court-created
privileges is highly desirable.

Schneider, 563 So. 2d 1134, 1134-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Gearhart v. Etheridge, 208 S.E.2d 460, 461 (Ga.
1974); Capps v. Wood, 718 P.2d 1216, 1219-20 (Idaho 1986); In re October 1985 Grand Jury No. 746, 530 N.E.2d
453, 456-57 (. 1988); First Cmty. Bank & Trust v. Kelley, Hardesty, Smith & Co., 663 N.E.2d 218, 221-22 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin, 714 A.2d 188, 192-94 (Md. 1998); People v. Paasche, 525
N.W.2d 914,917 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); McNair v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 885 P.2d 576, 577-78 (Nev. 1994);
Fed. Ins. Co. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328, 329-30 (Tenn. 1991). A limited privilege may exist in
Kansas. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-401 (2001); Holley v. Allen Drilling Co., 740 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Kan. 1987).
318. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C) (1973).
319. An amendment to the New Mexico Constitution may be proposed by a constitutional convention, an
independent commission, or in either house of the legislature. N.M. CONST. art. XIX, §§ 1-2. A constitutional
convention requires a two-thirds vote of the legislature and a majority vote by the electorate, and amendments
proposed by the convention require a majority vote of the electorate to be enacted. Id. § 2. Whether originating in
either house or by commission, a proposed amendment requires a majority vote in each house, and thereafter, the
proposed amendment is submitted to the electorate and requires a majority vote of the electorate in order to be
enacted. See id. §§ 1-2.
320. See Roberts v. Chaple, 369 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (holding accountant potentially liable
for unauthorized disclosure of client information contrary to accountant-client privilege); Orban v. Krull, 805
N.E.2d 450, 453-54 (Ind.Ct. App. 2004) (same).
321. See Simona Martinez-McConnell, Note, The Unstated Tension in Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v.
Blackmer: A Divergence Between Formalismand Functionalism, 36 N.M. L. REv. 661, 685 (2006).
The controversy concerning the supreme court's exclusive rule-making power may be viewed as the ebb
and flow of two different approaches to separation of powers concerns: functionalism and formalism. Id. at 664-65.
Functionalism is pragmatic, allowing shared functions such as rule making, provided that one branch does not
encroach on the functions or increase its power at the expense of another branch. Id. at 665. Formalism is concerned
with constitutional limits on authority and leads to bright-line rules on authority. Id. at 667. At various times, the
New Mexico Supreme Court has endorsed either approach in discussing its power over rule making. The
promulgation of Rule 11-501, Ammerman v. HubbardBroadcastingand State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride probably
constitute the high-water mark for formalism. Id. at 672-75. Recent decisions such as Albuquerque Rape Crisis
Centerand Romero have assumed a more functional tone, recognizing a role for the legislature in enacting statutes
that might affect the court's rules, provided that they do not conflict. Id. at 661-62. The advantage of the
functionalist approach is that it allows both the judiciary and the legislature to respond to perceived problems, while
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Of course, resolution of this issue could occur through litigation, and a client
asserting an accountant-client privilege might be encouraged by Albuquerque Rape
Crisis Center with its more moderate views toward legislatively created privileges
and by Romero with its concern for policy judgments of the legislature expressed
through statutes. Alternatively, the New Mexico Supreme Court could act
administratively and refer the issue to its Rules of Evidence Committee.322 That
committee may act upon its own motion, in response to a request from the supreme
court, or in response to a request from the bar.323 The supreme court, however, is the
only body that could recognize or adopt an enforceable accountant-client privilege
absent further change in the law or a constitutional amendment allowing for the
legislative enactment of evidentiary rules. And with any new privilege, proponents
would have to make a strong case that such a privilege is integral to the proper
functioning of the accountant-client relationship and that the public and private
benefits of such a privilege outweigh the loss of reliable evidence that would no
longer be admissible in state proceedings. This may be a difficult case to make given
the federal government's refusal to recognize such a privilege and the current
regulatory trend of requiring greater financial responsibility by public companies
(echoed by professional standards), more responsibility by auditors and accountants
to detect fraud and misstatement that is material, and more peer review among
accountants.324
VI. CONCLUSION
New Mexico has a legislatively created accountant-client privilege that prohibits
an accountant from disclosing information gained during an engagement or that may
have been disclosed by a client to an accountant, except with the client's written
consent. The major justification for the privilege is to encourage full and frank
disclosure by clients to their accountants in order to enhance the accountant-client
relationship and enable the accountant to better represent and provide services to the
client. A minor justification for the privilege is to enhance the client's financial
privacy.

recognizing the supreme court's final word when it comes to rules of practice and procedure, particularly evidentiary
privileges. Id. at 664-65.
322. Rule 23-106(1) NMRA (rule-making procedure); id. R. 23-106(J)(4) (listing the Rules of Evidence
Committee as a standing committee).
323. Id. R. 23-106(I). The supreme court has recently referred issues involving claimed privileges to its Rules
of Evidence Committee. Estate of Romero ex rel. Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMSC-028, 22, 137 P.3d 611,
619; Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 119, 120 P.3d 820, 826-27.
324. The New Mexico Public Accountancy Board commissioned a multi-phase research study to assess the
potential effect of applying some or all of Sarbanes-Oxley to private companies in New Mexico. I N.M. PUB.
ACCOUNTANCY BD., SARBANEs-OxLEY ACr Focus GROUP AND TOWN HALL MEETING ANALYSIS 4 (2005),

availableathttp://www.rld.state.nm.us/accountancy/PDFs/Sarbanes-Oxley%2OVolume%201 .pdf. The study found
little support among business professionals and CPAs for adopting all of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions but some
support for adopting certain provisions. See H N.M. PUB. ACCOUNTANCY BD., SARBANES-OxLEY ACT SURVEY
RESEARCH AMONG BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS AND CPAs 3-4 (2005), available at http:llwww.rld.state.nin.us/

accountancy/PDFs/Sarbanes-Oxley%2oVolume%202.pdf. Based on the study, the Board concluded that
"implementing Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in New Mexico would not be beneficial to either the business community
or the public." N.M. Public Accountancy Board, http://www.rld.state.nm.uslb&claccountancylNews/news.htm (last
visited Apr. 22, 2007).
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An accountant-client privilege, like any privilege, results in the suppression of
relevant evidence -that might be used to more accurately decide a case. Several
justifications have been advanced against recognizing such a privilege, including (1)
that much of the information communicated by clients to accountants will find its
way into publicly disclosed reports, (2) that accountants are already under an ethical
obligation not to disclose client information, and (3) that legal sanctions encourage
clients and accountants to fully disclose information without the need for an
evidentiary privilege.
Any discussion of an accountant-client privilege inevitably invites comparison
to an attorney-client privilege, which is a widely recognized common-law privilege.
Lawyers are tasked with zealously representing clients within the bounds of the law,
and an attorney-client privilege is deemed essential to encourage client disclosure,
thereby furthering observance of the law and the administration of justice.
Accountants have broader institutional obligations that depend upon full and fair
disclosure to third parties such as investors, creditors, and regulatory authorities (i.e.,
taxation and securities regulatory bodies). These broader institutional obligations
may militate against such a privilege. An accountant-client privilege may be in some
tension with an accountant's duty to investigate and report material misstatements
affecting the financial statements, whether caused by error or fraud. This
responsibility certainly applies to auditing, and accountants performing some nonattest services are now required to report such information should it come to their
attention. Given the policy choices inherent in considering whether to recognize an
accountant-client privilege, this seems like a matter upon which the legislature
would be competent to act.
Federal law does not recognize a common law accountant-client privilege or
work-product privilege that might shield the testimony or work product of an
accountant. Although a federally authorized tax practitioner-client privilege exists,
it provides very limited protection because it only protects client communications
in the context of an accountant rendering legal advice in certain civil matters.
Confidential communications between accountant and client might be protected
under the attorney-client privilege, but only where the accountant is working under
the direction of the client's attorney and is providing services exclusively for the
rendition of legal advice.
Accountant-client privileges from other jurisdictions, as well as the New Mexico
Rules of Evidence and the law of attorney-client privilege, provide guidance with
respect to how the New Mexico accountant-client privilege might operate as well
as reveal its limitations. Doctrines of waiver, the crime-fraud exception, and
disclosure for professional licensure matters are common limitations on the
privilege. Although the lack of a federal accountant-client privilege may lessen the
practical significance of the lack of a state accountant-client privilege, accountants
certainly deal with matters involving state law where a privilege might benefit the
client. But given the New Mexico Supreme Court's plenary power over rules of
evidence as well as the enactment of the rules of evidence, which omit a role for the
legislature in formulating privileges, it is doubtful that New Mexico's accountantclient privilege is enforceable in New Mexico courts.
Two recent New Mexico Supreme Court decisions, Albuquerque Rape Crisis
Center v. Blackmer and Estate of Romero ex rel. Romero v. City of Santa Fe, appear
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to have moderated this approach somewhat. Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center
recognized a legislatively created privilege that had close correspondence to existing
constitutional or court-created privileges, but the accountant-client privilege may
lack such correspondence because it differs from its closest analog, the attorneyclient privilege. Moreover, from a practical perspective, the ethical responsibilities
of New Mexico accountants suggested by statute, and implemented by regulation,
may conflict with such an accountant-client evidentiary privilege and indeed may
suggest that the accountant-client privilege was repealed by implication.
Clarity is needed in this area so that attorneys, accountants, and the public are
apprised of the validity of the 1933 evidentiary privilege concerning accountants and
clients beyond the confidentiality recognized in the New Mexico Public
Accountancy Act.325 Such clarity might come through litigation, a constitutional

amendment allowing the legislature to create privileges, repealing the present
accountant-client privilege, or, ideally, harmonizing the existing statutory provisions
concerning confidential client communications.

325. Compare NMSA 1978, § 38-6-6(C) (1973), with id. § 61-28B-24 (1999).

